Baars; Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness
Book	Page		Topic
01 Baars; Introduction	1		Introduction
Section I	11		Overview		10
02 Mandler	23		Some uses of consciousness (1975)		12
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	35		Consciousness and Neuroscience (1998)		12
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	35		It is probable that, at any moment, some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not -- what is the difference between them?		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	36		Why are we conscious?		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	36		Philosophers, in their carefree way, have invented a creature they call a "zombie," who is supposed to act just as normal people do but to be completely unconscious.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		It is often stated that a trained tennis player reacting to a fast serve has no time to see the ball -- the seeing comes afterwards.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		To be aware of an object or event, the brain has to construct a multilevel, explicit, symbolic interpretation of part of the visual scene.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		By multilevel symbolic interpretation we mean, loosely, the different levels and in the visual hierarchy.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		By explicit representation, we mean a "smallish" group of neurons to represent some aspect of visual scene.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		How many neurons are likely to be in a "smallish" group?  This is not yet known, but we would guess that the number to represent one aspect is likely to be closer to 102 -- 103 than to 104 -- 106.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		While the information needed to represent a face is contained in the firing of ganglion cells in the retina, there is no explicit representation of the face there.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		A representation of an object or an event will usually consists of representations of many of the relevant aspects of it, and these are likely to be distributed over different parts of the visual system.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		How these different representations are bound together is known as the binding problem.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	37		Much neural activity is usually needed for the brain to construct a representation. Most of this is probably unconscious.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		Conscious visual representation is likely to be distributed over more than one area of the cerebral cortex and possibly over certain subcortical structures as well.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		We have argued that conscious visual representation is not located in cortical area V1 (also called the striate cortex or area 17).		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		The activity in V1 may be crucial for most forms of vivid visual awareness.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		What is essential for visual consciousness?		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		The term 'visual consciousness' almost certainly covers a variety of processes.  When you are looking at a visual scene, the experience is very vivid.  This should be contrasted with the much less vivid and less detailed visual images produced by trying to remember the same scene.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		a vivid recollection is usually called a hallucination.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		It is possible that dimmer visual recollections are mainly due to the back pathways in the visual hierarchy acting on the random activity in the earlier stages of the system.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		Some form of very short-term memory seems almost essential for consciousness. This memory may be very transient, lasting for only a fraction of a second.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		Edelman has used the phrase 'the remembered present.'		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		The existence of iconic memory is well-established experimentally.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		Ever present eye movements.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		Although working memory expands the timeframe of consciousness, it is not obvious that it is essential for consciousness.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	38		The episodic memory enabled by the hippocampal system is not essential for consciousness, though a person without it is severely handicapped.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	39		Consciousness is enriched by visual attention, though attention is not essential for visual consciousness.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	39		Attention is broadly of two types -- (1) bottom-up, caused by the sensory input, and (2) top-down, produced by the planning parts of the brain.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	39		Visual attention can be directed to either a location in the visual field or to one or more (moving) objects.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	39		To interpret the visual input, the brain must arrive at a coalition of neurons whose firing represents the best interpretation of the visual scene, often in competition with other possible but less likely interpretations.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	39		Classical blindsight		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		Some researchers considered the ventral stream of visual processing to be largely conscious.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		Researches have hypothesized that the direct projections from parietal cortex into the premotor areas are unconscious, whereas projections to the premotor areas via the prefrontal cortex are related to consciousness.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		Fuster's diagram showing fiber connections between cortical regions participating and a perception-action cycle.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		The little that is known of the neural anatomy would suggest that there are likely to be multiple cortical streams, with numerous anatomical connections between them.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		There are numerous pathways for most intermediate levels of the visual system to intermediate frontal regions.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	40		Brain always tries to use the quickest appropriate pathway for the situation at hand.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	41		Bistable percepts		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	41		It is not obvious where to look in the brain for the two alternative views of the Necker cube.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	41		Responses in the visual system during binocular rivalry.  Visual input into each eye is different, but perceptually overlapping.  Input is constant, at the percept changes.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	43		Electrical brain stimulation studies, with the roots going back to Penfield (1958), involves directly stimulating cortex or related structures in order to evoke a percept or behavioral act.		2
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	43		Crick and Koch have argued that a person is not directly conscious of the features represented by the neural activity in primary visual cortex.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	43		Activity in V1 may be necessary for vivid and veridical visual consciousness (as it is activity in the retinae), but the firing of none of the neurons in V1 directly correlates with what we consciously see.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	44		V1 cells do not project directly to any part of frontal cortex.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	44		Nor do the V1 cells project to the caudate nucleus of the basal ganglia, the intralamina nuclei of the thalamus, the claustrum, nor to the brainstem, with the exception of a small projection from peripheral V1 to the pons.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	44		If the structure of perception does not map to the receptive field properties of V1 cells, it is unlikely that these neurons directly give rise to consciousness.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	45		Severe damage to V1 is compatible with visual imagery in patients.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		We hypothesize that the NCC must have access to explicitly encoded visual information and directly project onto the planning stages of the brain, associated with the frontal lobes in general and with the prefrontal cortex in particular.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		We predict that patients unfortunate enough to have lost their entire prefrontal cortex on both sides (including Broca's area) would not be visually conscious, although they might still have well preserved, unconscious, visual-motor abilities.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		Gamma oscillations		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		The existence of gamma oscillations remains in doubt in higher visual cortical areas.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		We remain agnostic with respect to the relevance of gamma oscillations to conscious perception.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		It is possible that gamma oscillations subserve attention or figure-ground in early visual processing.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		At this time there is no agreed philosophical answer to the problem of consciousness, except that most living philosophers do not believe in an immaterial soul that is distinct from the body.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	46		While philosophers have in the past raised interesting questions and pointed to possible conceptual confusions, they have had a very poor record, historically, in arriving at valid scientific answers.  For this reason, neuroscientists should listen to the questions philosophers raise but should not be intimidated by their discussions.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		Problem of qualia		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		The problem of qualia is what Chalmers (1995) calls "The Hard Problem" -- a full account of the manner in which subjective experience arises from cerebral processes.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		What is the function of conscious experience?		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		Visual consciousness is largely private, i.e. it is inherently impossible to communicate the exact nature of what we are conscious of.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		To be conscious, there must be an explicit representation of each aspect of visual consciousness at each successive stage in the visual cortex.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		It is not possible to convey with the words the exact nature of a subjective experience.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	47		It is possible to convey a difference between subjective experiences -- to distinguish between red and orange, for example.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	48		If the neural correlate of blue depends on my past experience, and if my past experiences significantly different from yours, then it may not be possible to deduce that we both see blue in exactly the same way.		1
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	48		We suspect that meaning arises from the correlated firing of patterns of neurons and from the linkages to related representations.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	48		Neurons may be connected in a vast associational network, similar to a relational database.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	48		How are useful neuronal associations derived?  The obvious idea is that they depend very largely on the consistency of the interactions with the environment, especially during early development. Meaning can then be acquired later in life.		0
Crick & Koch; Consciousness and Neuroscience	50		The explanation of consciousness is one of the major unsolved problems of modern science.		2
Section II	55		Consciousness and vision		5
04 Anne Treisman	63		Binding problem -- various aspects of a stimulus combine to create a single, coherent conscious percept. (1998)		8
04 Anne Treisman	65		Model suggesting the relation between feature coding, spatial attention, and binding in object perception. (diagram)		2
05 Livingstone & Hubel	85		Effects of sleep and arousal on the processing of visual information in the cat. (1981)		20
06 Sheinberg & Logothetis	101		Role of temporal cortical areas in perceptual organization. (1997)		16
07 Tononi & Edelman	113		Neural correlates of conscious perception by frequency-tagged neuromagnetic responses. (1998)		12
08 Engel & Wolf Singer	125		Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness. (1999)		12
08 Engel & Wolf Singer	133		Synchronization is employed for feature binding and serves to disambiguate distributed response patterns.		8
08 Engel & Wolf Singer	138		Relation to of arousal and attention		5
09 Weiskrantz	147		Disconnected awareness for detecting, processing, and remembering in neurological patients. (1991)		9
09 Weiskrantz	149		aphasia		2
09 Weiskrantz	149		amnesia		0
09 Weiskrantz	150		agnosia		1
10 Cowey & Stoerig	155		Blindsight in monkeys. (1995)		5
11 Roger W. Sperry	163		Hemisphere disconnection and unity in conscious awareness. (1968)		8
11 Roger W. Sperry	167		Functional lateralization evident in behavioral tests of forebrain commissurotomy (split-brain) patients. (diagram)		4
12 Goodale & Milner	175		Separate visual pathways for perception and action. (1992)		8
12 Goodale & Milner	176		Two visuomotor systems: "what" versus "how"		1
12 Goodale & Milner	178		Dorsal and ventral systems in the monkey.		2
Section III	201		Attention -- Selecting one conscious stream among many		23
14 Anne Treisman	207		Strategies and models of selective attention. (1969)		6
14 Anne Treisman	222		Certain analyzers are located very peripherally in the nervous system (e.g., the three types of color receptors in the retina)		15
16 MacKay	235		Aspects of the theory of comprehension, memory, and attention. (1973)		13
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	263		Function of the thalami reticular complex -- the searchlight hypothesis. (1984)		28
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		The thalamus is often classified in two parts -- the dorsal thalamus, which is the main bulk of it, and the ventral thalamus.		1
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		Almost all input to the cortex, with the exception of the olfactory input, passes through the thalamus.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		The thalamus is sometimes called the gateway to the cortex. .		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		For each projection from a region of the thalamus there is a corresponding reverse projection from that part of the cortex to the corresponding region of the thalamus.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		The reticular complex is a thin sheet of neurons, in most places only a few cells thick, which partly surrounds the dorsal thalamus.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		All axons from the thalamus to the cerebral cortex pass through the reticular complex, as do all of the reverse projections from the cortex to the thalamus.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	264		The intralamina nuclei of the thalamus, which project very strongly to the striatum, also send their axons through the reticular complex, as may some of the axons from the globus pallidus that project back to the thalamus.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	265		Many of the axons that pass in both directions through the reticular complex give off collaterals that make excitatory synaptic contacts.		1
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	267		von der Malsburg synapses		2
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	267		The only plausible way to create a neural pathway in a short time is to strengthen an existing synapse in some way.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	267		In 1981 von der Malsburg put forward in a little-known paper the idea of temporarily-strengthened existing synapses to form a pathway.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	267		von der Malsburg proposed that when there is a strong correlation between presynaptic and postsynaptic activity, the strength of the synapse is temporarily increased -- a dynamic version of Hebb's well-known rule.		0
Francis Crick; Searchlight Hypothesis	267		von der Malsburg further proposed that with uncorrelated pre- and postsynaptic signals, the synaptic strength would be temporarily decreased below its normal resting value.		0
Michael Posner; Attention	279		Attention -- the mechanisms of consciousness. (1994)		12
Michael Posner; Attention	279		An understanding of consciousness must rest on an appreciation of the brain networks that subserve attention.		0
Michael Posner; Attention	284		The anatomy of the anterior cingulate provides pathways for connecting it to both the posterior parietal area and to anterior areas active during language tasks.		5
Michael Posner; Attention	284		Lateral areas of the prefrontal cortex play a key role in holding online a representation of past events.		0
Michael Posner; Attention	284		While specialized areas of the lateral prefrontal cortex appeared to hold the relevant information online, the anterior cingulate would be playing a role in the executive functions of awareness and control.		0
Michael Posner; Attention	285		Edelman views the cingulate and hippocampus as involved in the integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive information needed for conscious processing.		1
Michael Posner; Attention	286		Reentrant processing --  higher-level associations are made by fibers that reenter the brain areas which processed the initial input.		1
Michael Posner; Attention	286		Results of attentional control are widely distributed, resulting in amplification of activity in the anatomical areas that originally computed that information.		0
Michael Posner; Attention	287		Anterior cingulate connections to limbic, thalamic, and basal ganglia pathways distribute prefrontal midline network activity to widely dispersed connections involved in cognitive computations.		1
Michael Posner; Attention	287		Neurotransmitter norepinephrine appears to be involved in maintaining the alert state.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	291		Attention, Awareness, and the Triangular Circuit. (1997)		4
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		Visual shapes are coded in clusters of neurons within the inferotemporal cortex (IT).		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		Visual locations are coded in clusters of neurons within the posterior parietal cortex (PPC).		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		Plans of actions and semantic attributes of objects involve codes that appear to be distributed across specific modules of the frontal cortex.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		The controlling agent of attention is presumed to be encoded within specific areas of the prefrontal cortex (PFC).		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		The controlling modules of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are influenced by the basal ganglia, which are closely connected with the motivation-related hypothalamus.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		Attentional operations exert their effects all ongoing cognitive related events by modulating the activity levels of neurons in the cerebral cortex.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		The functional unit of the cerebral cortex is widely assumed to be not the individual neuron but ensembles of neurons.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		Physiologists have assumed that the functional unit is the group of neural circuits contained in the vertical, cylinder-like structures of the cortical sheet call cortical columns.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	292		A cortical column corresponds to the mass of neural tissue lining under a 1 mm x1 mm square area along the surface of the cortex and spanning the 1.5- to 2.0-mm thickness of the cortical sheet.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		The number of neurons contained within the typical cortical column is said to be on the order of 100,000, while a typical column in the area V1 contains nearer to 180,000 neurons.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		The cortical column is sometimes subdivided into minicolumns of various sizes, having widths of about 400, 200, and 30 µ wide, containing about 23,000, 5500, and 140 neurons, respectively.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		Vertical groups of neurons are centered around the long vertical dendrites of layer 5 neurons, forming a cylinder-like volume having a diameter of approximately 30 µ.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		The minicolumn, which contains about 140 neurons, has been proposed as a functional unit of the cortex.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		Axons of layer 5 neurons provide the major source of inputs to the thalamic relay neurons in the triangular circuit.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		Since it is highly likely that minicolumns function in groups, it seems appropriate to use the term columns to refer to the layer 5 neuron groups.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		Anatomical evidence indicates that the functional unit of the cerebral cortex is a columnar cluster of neuronal circuits, with a width that varies between 0.5 and 1.0 mm, so that a column contains on the order of 50,000 to 100,000 neurons.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		The appropriate level of description of function taking place within a column appears to be not the individual neurons, nor a local circuit of several neurons, but rather in large bundle of circuits, whose organization is tailored to the particular function of that column.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	293		It is not implied that a given cognitive event corresponds to one cortical column.  It seems more likely that combinations of cortical columns within and between cortical regions constitute the cognitive unit.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	294		It is proposed that simultaneous activity in columns of two or more separated cortical regions define the attentional event, so that, regarded as a unit of cognition, the attentional event involves not one but two or more functional units of the cerebral cortex.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	294		Viewed cortically, the expression of attention corresponds to a difference in activity levels between the column clusters corresponding to the attended (target) components and its neighboring (distractor) components.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	295		The expression of attention could be based on one of three types of operations -- enhancement of the target columns, suppression of surrounding distractor columns, or a combination of these two operations.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	297		Selection of the target column requires top-down signals, particularly when the target-distractor similarity is high and there is no appreciable preattentive "popout."		2
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	299		Triangular circuit		2
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	299		Most of the knowledge we have of cortical and thalamic circuitry has been obtained from studies of the primary visual cortex and its adjacent areas.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	299		The hypothesized triangular circuit involves connections between two cortical columns together with connections to the thalamus.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	299		In a triangular circuit involving areas V1 and V2, the direct, (forward)  fibers arise from layer 2 of the V1 column and terminate in the middle layers of the V2 column.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	299		The indirect connecting fibers of the triangular circuit connect V1 and V2 columns via a thalamic relay in the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	300		The triangular circuit begins with neurons in a V1 column that connect with a V2 column by a direct connection and by an indirect connection by way of the thalamus.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	300		Layer 5 neurons fire in bursts of a few spikes at rates at least as high as 250 Hz, with intrinsic intrabursts firing rates on the order of 15 Hz.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	300		The intrinsically spiking layer 5 neurons synapse near the cell bodies of thalamic neurons and are therefore in a privileged position to drive the spike outputs of the cell body.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	300		It is conjectured that the thalamocortical loop, involving the ascending thalamic relay fibers together with the feedback fibers from layer 6 neurons, has the ability to enhance firing rates of input fibers arriving from layer 5 cells of another column.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	301		The triangular circuit that flows through thalamic neurons contains characteristics that can greatly enhance the firing rates of the layer 5 output neurons from the column of origin, while this output is being transmitted to the middle layers of the destination column.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	301		Since all regions of the cortex are connected with the thalamus, it seems highly probable that the triangular circuit exists wherever cortical columns in one area communicate with columns in another area.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	301		The set of triangular circuits of interest in the present discussion are those that project activation in the top-down direction to posterior cortical columns in which attention is expressed.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	302		The DLPFC area is crucially involved in voluntary control of attention for locations, while the VLPFC area is crucially involved in voluntary control of attention for shape and color.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	302		Several PET experiments with humans have shown activation of the pulvinar during the visual attention.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	303		Occipital temporal areas and posterior parietal areas, which are closely connected with the pulvinar nucleus, are presumed to exhibit expressions of attention to shapes and locations.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	303		PET studies show activation both in thalamic nuclei and in cortical areas of attentional expression and attentional control that are reciprocally connected with the thalamic nuclei.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	304		The thalamus serves as the mechanism that amplifies signals sent (top-down) from regions of attentional control to regions of attentional expression located in posterior and anterior cortical areas.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	305		A well-chosen metaphor can sometimes promote the understanding of complex systems of operations.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		Attention is assumed to be an event in the brain having three aspects that are connected by the triangular circuit.		4
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		Three aspects of attention are: -- (1) expression of attention in cortical columns, (2) the mechanism that directly activates the columns, and (3) the control over which columns will express attention and how intense the expression will be.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		For the expression of attention, columns in the posterior and anterior cortex that serve cognitive functions, such as perceptions of objects and attributes, and the organization and execution of action plans.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		For the mechanism of attention, column-like sectors of thalamic nuclei, whose excitatory neurons activate neurons in the corresponding cortical columns.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		For the control of attention, cortical columns of the prefrontal regions of the anterior cortex.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	309		The triad of sites connected by the triangular circuit is initially activated by two different classes of sources, one within the system and one outside the system.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		Internal sources normally activate the triangular circuit at the prefrontal control node.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		External sources are sensory stimuli that activate the cortical column site where attention is eventually expressed.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		For highly routine situations, much of the object identification and action selection occur automatically, without the need for prefrontal control operating through the triangular circuit.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		There are situations that invites us to savor the activity in particular cortical columns that serve sensations and feelings.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		Attentional system enhances and sustains the sensations.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	310		The necessary conditions for an awareness event is the existence of an attentional event, where the attentional event is defined by the activity of a triangular circuit of attention, which includes controlling columns located in the prefrontal cortex.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		Activity in both thalamic and cortical structures (as well is and brainstem reticular nuclei) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the state of waking consciousness.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		Researchers have implicated the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus in awareness, owing in part to their widespread connections across the cortex, their direct efferents to the basal ganglia, and their sensitivity to very small lesions.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		The broad cortical distribution of brainstem neuromodulatory fibers, together with that of the intralamina thalamic fibers, serve to modulate general states of waking and alertness, which are preconditions for the more local activation patterns required for attention and awareness.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		Distinction between the brain state of wakefulness and the state of attending to one of the many available cognitive aspects of wakefulness		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		Awareness introduces an agent involved when attention is voluntarily directed to some event.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		Role of references to the self in states of awareness.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		The event of awareness requires that attention be directed to the regions where the self is expressed at the same time that attention is directed to the cortical regions where the object is expressed.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	311		To distinguish the two kinds of triangular attention circuits, they will be labeled object-attended and self-attended circuits.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	312		As a result of the temporal coincidence between the two triangular circuits, not only is attention being directed to the self along with attention to an object, but attention is being directed to the self doing the control of attention to an object.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	312		Attention to self-representation is assumed to involve the triangular circuit in a manner similar to attention to objects of perception, cognition, and action.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	312		Bodily landscapes and verbal categories are represented by sets of corresponding cortical columns whose activity is controlled by voluntary prefrontal columns acting through the thalamus in triangular circuits.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	312		Neural activity does not produce an awareness event unless the prefrontal area amplifies that activity to a particular level and sustains it there for some minimum duration.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	312		In the pathological condition of depersonalization, the self-representation is dissociated from the perception of the body, so that perceptions and actions by the body are believed to be happening to someone other than the self.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		The pathological condition of depersonalization, in which self-representation is dissociated from the perceptions of the body could occur in the prefrontal areas where the controls of attention to the self-representations and to the object representations (and action representations) are closely related.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		Prefrontal area is believed to have a crucial role  in the temporal integration of operations that control the actions.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		If defects occur in the temporal coordination of the actions controlling activities in the self-attended and object-attended triangular circuits, then the person's experience of self as an agency of control could be compromised, resulting in the observed disorder of depersonalization, which disrupts the sense of awareness.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		Relatively brief durations of combined object-attended and subject-attended events suffice for a realization event of awareness.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		Sensations of the  bodily-landscape kind are typically described as "feelings."		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		Sensations and feelings vary in intensity, and it is assumed that the activities  in the prefrontal cortex, acting through the in attentional triangular circuit, are able not only to prolong sensations and feelings but to modulate their levels of intensity.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	313		Individuals sometimes "forget themselves" when they are writing, or engaged in vigorous conversation, or enraptured by music.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		Attention to an object requires the simultaneous activity of three brain regions that are connected by a triangular circuit, and awareness of an object requires an additional component, which is attention to some representation of the self.		1
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		For both kinds of attention, object-attention and self-attention, the three types of brain regions connected by the triangular circuit are cortical columns of attentional expression, a group of thalamic neurons that enhance activities in these columns, and a set of prefrontal cortical columns that control the choice of columns and control the level and duration of enhanced activity.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		The thalamic component of the attentional triangular circuit operates by modulating firing rates in a column without changing the informational signal existing in that column.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		The expression of attention in a set of cortical columns may involve widely separated columns, such as attending both to a particular body shape and to its direction of movement.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		The expression of attention to self-representations may involve widely separated cortical columns corresponding to the bodily landscape and/or cortical columns corresponding to verbal-based memories of autobiographical events.		0
LaBerge; Attention, the Triangular Circuit	314		An attention event is a necessary but not sufficient condition for and awareness event, so that there can be attention without awareness, but no awareness without attention.		0
Section IV	319		Immediate memory -- The fleeting conscious present		5
Baars; Essential Sources	321		Immediate memory is closely associated with consciousness. (2003)		2
Baars; Essential Sources	321		In immediate memory, faded items can be retrieved intact for about 10 seconds.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	322		The part of immediate memory that can be rehearsed is now usually call working memory.		1
Baars; Essential Sources	322		With rehearsal, we can recall about 7 items, and without rehearsal between 3 and 4 items.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	322		Chunking -- information that can be coherently organized can be treated as a single element in working memory.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	322		Working memory depends fundamentally on long-term memory.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	322		Working memory may be nothing but the currently activated, separate components of a long-term memory.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	322		Working memory is not the same as consciousness, but conscious experience and working memory are closely related.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	323		It is useful to treat consciousness as a kind of momentary working memory.		1
Baars; Essential Sources	323		Inner rehearsal of working memory items appears to activate both Broca's and Wernicke's areas in the left hemisphere.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	323		Inner speech activates the same parts of the brain that produce and perceived outer speech.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	323		Word meaning is often associated with sensory images, which are presumably more posterior.		0
Baars; Essential Sources	323		Widespread brain processing in a working memory task occurs during the first few hundred milliseconds after stimulus presentation and may involve a widespread comparison process between expected and actual stimulus.  [recursion]  [Bayesian inference]  [Fuster's  perception-action cycle]		0
Baars; Essential Sources	323		Binding problem -- various aspects of a stimulus combine to create a single, coherent conscious percept.		0
22 George Sperling	325		Information available in brief visual presentations. (1960)		2
23 George Miller	357		The magical number seven. (1956)		32
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	373		Control of short-term memory (1971)		16
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	373		All phases of memory are seen to consists of small units of information that are associatively related.		0
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	374		Our account of short-term and long-term storage does not require that the stores necessarily be in different parts of the brain or involve different physiological structures.		1
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	374		Short-term memory may be considered as simply a temporary activation of some portion of long-term memory.		0
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	374		We tend to equate the short-term memory with consciousness, i.e. the thoughts and information of which we are currently aware can be considered part of the contents of the short-term memory.		0
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	375		Because consciousness is equated with short-term memory and because control processes are centered in and act through it, the short-term memory is considered a working memory -- a system in which decisions are made, problems are solved, and information flow is directed.		1
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	375		Retrieval of information from short-term memory is quite fast and accurate.		0
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	375		Retrieval time for information in short-term memory such as letters and numbers ranges from 10 to 30 ms per character.		0
Atkinson & Shiffrin; Short-Term Memory	375		Retrieval of information from long-term memory is considerably more complicated.  So much information is contained in the long term memory that the major problem is finding access to some small subset of the information.		0
25 Baddeley	389		Verbal and Visual Subsystems of Working Memory (1993)		14
25 Baddeley	389		Phonological loop		0
25 Baddeley	390		Visuo-spatial sketchpad		1
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	395		Prefrontal landscape (1992)		5
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	395		A major organizing principle of prefrontal function has been a duality between the dorsolateral and orbital cortices.		0
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	396		Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has a generic function -- "on-line" processing of information or working memory in the service of a whole range of cognitive functions; (2) the process is iteratively represented throughout several and possibly many subdivisions of the prefrontal area; (3) each autonomous subdivision integrates attentional, memorial, motor and possibly affective dimensions of behavior by virtue of network connectivity with relevant sensory, motor, and limbic areas of the brain		1
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	400		Multiple working memory domains		4
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	402		Distributed networks subserve sensory, motor, limbic, and mnemonic components.		2
Goldman-Rakie; Prefrontal Landscape	404		Supervisory attentional system, the central executive, and the domain-specific slave systems.		2
Smith & Jonides; Storage and Executive Processes in Frontal Lobes	409		Storage and executive processes in the frontal lobes. (1999)		5
John et al; Consciousness -- Multiple Coherent Ensembles	419		Consciousness and cognition may be mediated by multiple independent coherent ensembles. (1997)		10
28 John; Easton; Isenhart	420		Anatomical dispersion of memory.		1
28 John; Easton; Isenhart	422		Spatio Temporal coherence		2
28 John; Easton; Isenhart	423		Event-related potential evidence of parallel processing.		1
28 John; Easton; Isenhart	427		Spatial and temporal principal components analysis.		4
28 John; Easton; Isenhart	432		Landscapes of working memory.		5
Section V	453		Internal Sources -- Visual Images and Inner Speech		21
29 Kosslyn	457		Cognitive neuroscience of mental imagery (1988)		4
30 Farah	469		Neural basis of mental imagery (1989)		12
31 Singer	479		Experimental studies of ongoing conscious experience. (1993)		10
31 Singer	479		Rorschach inkblots		0
32 Ericsson & Simon	493		Verbal reports on thinking (1987)		14
Section VI	515		Below the Threshold of Sensory Consciousness		22
33 Cheesman; Distinguish Conscious from Unconscious Perception	519		Distinguishing conscious from unconscious perceptual processes. (1986)		4
33 Cheesman; Distinguish Conscious from Unconscious Perception	519		No general agreement concerning whether conscious perceptual processing is necessary for the perception of meaning.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	541		The psychological unconscious (1980)		22
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	541		Behaviorism, reacting against the methodological deficiencies of introspection, not only rejected the unconscious but also rid itself of consciousness.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	541		For William James (1890), consciousness was the very subject matter of psychology.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	541		Psychoanalysis, as reflected in much of clinical practice, has continued to base itself on unconscious mental processes.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	543		Selective Attention		2
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	543		Inherent in all the major models of attention is the assumption that at least part of the cognition related to attention takes place outside of awareness.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	545		In the course of perceptual processing the stimulus makes contact with long-term memory prior to the point at which awareness occurs.		2
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	545		Suggests that processing outside of awareness is qualitatively different from processing within awareness.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	545		Consciousness is bound up with processes that involve a limited capacity system.  This imposes a serial order upon what are essentially widespread parallel processes initiated by a stimulus.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		In selective attention, an initial phase of cognitive activity occurs outside of awareness.		1
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Processes outside of awareness interact with and influence ongoing and subsequent conscious psychological processes, insofar as they determine what interest consciousness.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		It is hypothesized that cognitive processes outside of awareness are based on a different mode of cognition from that of conscious processes.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Unconscious process is multichanneled, whereas conscious processes is single channeled.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Preattentive cognition is global and gestalt in character.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Multiple codes can be activated outside of awareness even though only a single code may enter consciousness.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		All of the models of selective attention are based, not on clinical data, but largely on experimental investigations.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Percepts can be stored in long-term memory and can exert an active influence on simultaneous conscious processes.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		Subliminal Perception		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	546		In dichotic listening experiments for selective attention, stimuli are usually presented separately to each ear.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	547		Selective attention and subliminal perception represent endpoints on a single continuum of information processing.		1
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	547		At any given time, a person is presented with a broad array of stimuli of varying intensities and varying relevance to adaptive tasks.  Selection on some basis must occur.  Subliminal stimuli do not become conscious simply because they are too weak in intensity, even though they may be highly relevant.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	547		In subliminal perception, complex effects of stimuli that do not enter awareness can persist well beyond a few seconds or minutes.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	547		Subliminal perception is concerned with stimuli too weak to become conscious immediately, no matter how much attention is directed to to the stimulus.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	547		Subliminal stimuli have detectable effects on conscious processes, both immediately, and in some cases, after an interval of time.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	548		Subliminal effects emerge in changed states of consciousness, as in dreams.		1
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	548		Subliminal stimuli can be used to explore differences between unconscious and conscious processes.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	549		In subliminal perception, the intensity of the stimulus is great enough to elicit activity in the sensory fibers but lacks sufficient energy to activate the nonspecific reticular system. Thus information reaches the cortex without awareness of the stimulus itself.		1
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	549		Subliminal perception, according to one researcher, is made possible because the primary afferent system (which conveys sensory information to the cortex) conducts faster than the secondary, nonspecific system (which is involved in reticular activation).		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	549		As a consequence of this disparity in conduction speed, it is possible for information reach the cortex and for the cortex to exert inhibitory control over the reticular system.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	551		Binocular rivalry		2
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	551		Binocular rivalry studies offer another experimental paradigm in which cortical evoked potentials may be detected in the absence of subjective perception of the eliciting stimulus.		0
Shevrin; Psychological Unconscious	551		The general procedure for binocular rivalry studies is to present different images simultaneously to the two eyes  At different times, one or the other eye will be dominant. This subject will be aware of the image presented to one eye, while being unaware of the image presented to the suppressed eye.		0
Libet; Brain Stimulation Conscious Experiences	559		Brain stimulation in the study of neuronal functions for conscious sensory experiences. (1982)		8
Libet; Brain Stimulation Conscious Experiences	559		After the sensory stimulus, the earliest neural messages reach the appropriate primary sensory cortex first within 10--25 ms.		0
Libet; Brain Stimulation Conscious Experiences	559		The association cortex surrounding primary areas and occupying the vast intervening areas is functionally involved with the more complex aspects of motor and sensory integrations and of higher functions generally.		0
Libet; Brain Stimulation Conscious Experiences	559		The "primary evoked potential" is followed by wider  cortical distributions related to cognitive aspects of the sensory response.		0
Section VII	573		Consciousness and Memory		14
	575		Explicit and implicit memory		2
	576		Recognition vocabulary of educated English speakers contains about 100,000 words.		1
	577		Retrieval, recall, and recognition.		1
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	579		Memory and consciousness (1985)		2
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	580		Three different kinds of memory or memory systems -- procedural, semantic, episodic.		1
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	580		Each of the three memory systems is characterized by a different kind of consciousness.		0
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	580		Procedural memory is characterized by anoetic consciousness (non-knowing).		0
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	581		Semantic memory is characterized by noetic consciousness (knowing).		1
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	581		Episodic memory is correlated with autonoetic consciousness (self knowing).		0
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	581		Autonoetic consciousness confers the special phenomenal flavor to the remembering of past events, that flavor that distinguishes remembering from other kinds of awareness, such as those characterizing perceiving, thinking, imagining, dreaming.		0
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	583		Autonoetic consciousness, subjective time, and episodic memory.		2
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	583		Some amnesic patients live in a permanent present.		0
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	588		Adaptive value of autonoetic consciousness.		5
Tulving; Memory and Consciousness	588		We have often been told that the human brain is the most complicated piece of matter in the universe.		0
Schacter; Conscious Recollection, Hippocampal	593		Conscious recollection and the human hippocampal formation. (1996)		5
Schacter; Conscious Recollection, Hippocampal	593		Hippocampal formation is thought to be not involved in the nonconscious or implicit form of memory known is priming.		0
Reber; Implicit Learning	603		Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. (1989)		10
Reber; Implicit Learning	605		Probability learning		2
Reber; Implicit Learning	605		Probability learning is a subtle process of learning implicitly about the stochastic structure of an event sequence to which a person has been exposed.		0
Reber; Implicit Learning	614		On mental representation.		9
Reber; Implicit Learning	621		On the origins of unconscious cognition.		7
Reber; Implicit Learning	624		There is a standard heuristic in evolutionary biology that older primitive systems are more robust and resistant to insult than newer more complex systems.		3
Reber; Implicit Learning	625		Institutionalized depressives, schizophrenics, and alcoholics with organic brain damage were statistically indistinguishable from normal persons on an implicit learning task.		1
Reber; Implicit Learning	625		Implicit learning is robust in the face of serious psychological and/or neurological disorders.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	631		Attention, automatism, and consciousness (1997)		6
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Control of behavior is sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious (e.g. walking vs. mountain climbing).		9
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Process of controlling behavior, and controlling attention, is sometimes conscious and sometimes not (e.g. moving visual attention systematically in a visual search vs. attention moving to a location containing a sudden evident movement)		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Attentive processing is limited in capacity, but not necessarily serial in character.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Distinction between parallel and serial processing does not map well onto the distinction between automatic and attended processing.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Thoughts high in consciousness often seem serial.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		At times consciousness seems parallel, as when we attend to the visual scene before us.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Distinction between parallel and serial processing does not seem to map well onto the distinction between conscious and unconscious.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Possible links between consciousness and memory.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Association of short-term memory with conscious thought.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Possible consciousness of information and very short-term sensory memories.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Whether to assess the presence of memories using implicit or explicit tests.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Ways to distinguish memory from conscious perception.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	640		Consider the possibility that attentive processes can be identified because they invariably leave an explicit, episodic, memory trace, whereas automatic processes may not leave a memory trace that can be found in explicit memory tests.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		Stimuli near or below  threshold or stimuli embedded in massive amounts of other information.		1
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		Is attention necessary to produce explicit memory?		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		Attention is typically given in at least small amounts to all stimuli in the perceptual surround.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		We know little about the memorial fate of unattended stimuli.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		There is no good case for relating the distinction between attentive and automatic processing to that between the conscious and unconscious.		0
Shiffrin; Attention, Automatism, Consciousness	641		Despite the positive correlation between attention and consciousness, the mapping between the two conceptual frameworks is quite poor.		0
40 Langer & Imber	643		When practice makes imperfect -- debilitating effects of overlearning. (1979)		2
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		NCC -- an analysis of Cognitive Skill Learning. (1998)		12
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Two components of human consciousness -- content and arousal.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Reticular core of the brainstem via the thalamus to the cortex is responsible for arousal or alert wakefulness.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Once alert wakefulness has been achieved, we are much less certain which cortical systems are responsible for the content of our consciousness.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Many non-conscious cognitive, attentional and emotional processes occur in support of our conscious experiences.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Identify the brain systems supporting a task when it is novel and effortful compared with systems engaged when the task is routine and reflexive.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Brain systems unique to the novel state compared with the practiced state.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		Tasks involving motor as well is cognitive skills can be transformed from reflective, effortful tasks to reflexive, seemingly effortless tasks within a short period of time.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	655		From functional imaging studies in normal humans, the transformation from the novel state to the practiced state is accompanied by dramatic changes in the underlying brain circuitry concerned with the task.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	663		Widely distributed regions of both increases and decreases in brain activity.		8
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	663		Acquisition of language occurs by imitation.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	664		The supervisory attention system provides a mechanism whereby elements or schemas within the lower-level contention-scheduling system for routine, reflexive behaviors and thoughts can be temporarily modified by activating or inhibiting particular elements within it.		1
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	665		Patients with frontal lobe injury often act in an impulsive and reflexive manner as if they lack a supervisory attention system.		1
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	665		Brain regions uniquely involved in conscious, reflective behavior as distinct from regions concerned with reflexive, habitual performance.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	665		Multiple, widely distributed areas of the normal human brain, including the cerebellum, are involved in the performance of a novel speech production act.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	665		Naïve and practiced performance of a task are distinguished by qualitative differences in brain organization.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	667		Multiple regions across both cerebral hemispheres show a significant decrease in activity for a wide variety of tasks.  Included are regions along the midline in the orbitofrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus.		2
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	669		Anterior as well as posterior regions of the cerebral hemispheres, particularly prominent but not exclusively along the midline, are intensely active during the baseline state of the awake brain (such as when the eyes are closed or during passive viewing of a television monitor).		2
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	669		Animal studies suggests that the posterior cingulate cortex and the adjacent precuneus is involved in orientation within and interpretation of the environment.		0
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	670		Posterior cingulate cortex and adjacent precuneus can be hypothesized to be the region of the brain associated with the continuous gathering of information about the world around us.		1
Raichle; NCC Cognitive Skill Learning	670		Tasks requiring focused attention demand that broad information gathering be curtailed.  As a task becomes routine and requires less focused attention, the broad information gathering can resume.		0
42 Tversky & Kahneman	677		Availability -- a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. (1973)		7
43 Gardiner	697		Experiences of remembering, knowing, and guessing. (1998)		20
44 Jacoby	721		Measuring recollection -- strategic versus automatic influences of associative context. (1994)		24
Section VIII	737		Unconscious and "fringe" processes		16
45 Mangan	741		Conscious "fringe" -- bringing William James up to date. (2003)		4
45 Mangan	741		Fringe experience includes virtually every feeling in consciousness that is not a sensory experience in the narrowest sense.		0
45 Mangan	741		The "Aha!" experience of finding the right solution to a problem is a fringe experience (call at "rightness"), as is the opposite feeling that something is wrong, out of place, problematic ("wrongness").		0
45 Mangan	741		The term "qualia" refers to prototypically clear and vivid experiences,    that are easily inspected in the focus of attention,    and that belong to a specific sensory modality -- i.e. the experience of a sharp pain or the color red.		0
45 Mangan	741		William James considered fringe experience to be fundamental for understanding cognition in consciousness.		0
45 Mangan	741		The investigation of fringe phenomenology    will tell us as much about the cognitive operation of consciousness as qualia,    perhaps more.		0
45 Mangan	741		The fringe itself is completely conscious.		0
45 Mangan	750		Consciousness    is only able to resolve itself   to a certain level of detail    at any given moment.		9
45 Mangan	750		The capacity of consciousness is limited to about seven distinct "chunks" of experience.		0
45 Mangan	750		Most of consciousness's limited resources are devoted to articulating detailed entities in focal attention.		0
45 Mangan	750		Consciousness    cannot possibly represent in detail anything remotely approaching    the totality of information that bears on its cognitive activity.		0
45 Mangan	750		The fringe    is able to finesse the limited capacity of consciousness    by using just a few wisps of vague experience    to represent summary facts    about states of non-conscious information that are otherwise far too complex    for direct conscious representation.		0
45 Mangan	753		Information experienced inattentively    is still conscious,    although it lacks the overall specifiable organization    we find in an object in the focus of attention.		3
45 Mangan	756		How do deal quantitatively with gut feelings.		3
45 Mangan	756		If consciousness performs the cognitive functions it appears to perform,    it must somehow take into account    vast amounts of unconscious information.		0
45 Mangan	756		Articulation limitations of consciousness    make detailed representation    of context information impossible.		0
46 Baars	761		Fundamental role of context -- unconscious shaping of conscious information. (1988)		5
47 Kihlstrom	777		The cognitive unconscious (1987)		16
47 Kihlstrom	781		Subliminal perception		4
47 Kihlstrom	784		Implicit memory		3
47 Kihlstrom	787		Unconscious, preconscious, and subconscious		3
48 Hilgard	793		Pain and dissociation -- a study of hypnotic analgesia (1975)		6
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	805		Anosognosia in parietal lobe syndrome. (1995)		12
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	805		Anosognosia -- denial of illness		0
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	805		Some patients were completely paralyzed on the left side of the body as a result of a right hemisphere stroke, tended to deny their paralysis.		0
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	819		Jokes may be an attempt to trivialize what would otherwise be genuinely disturbing anomalies.		14
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	819		Humor and laughter -- a biological hypothesis.		0
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	821		Hobson's well-known proposal that dreams are essentially an attempt to see meaningful patterns in "noise" generated by PGO activity.		2
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	821		Winston has postulated that dreaming involves a rehearsal and consolidation of both instinctive and learned patterns of behavior. Winston's theory is based on his physiological work on the hippocampus.		0
Ramachandran; Anosognosia in Parietal Lobe Syndrome	822		Dreams may be a way of reenacting highly realistic simulations without taking any of the associated emotional risk or physical risk. They are nature's own virtual reality.		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	831		Implications for psychiatry of left and right cerebral specializations -- a neurophysiological context for unconscious processes. (1974)		9
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	831		Hemispheric specialization for different cognitive modes.		0
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	835		How integrated are the two hemispheres under normal conditions?		4
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	836		Factors contributing to a unity of consciousness.		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	837		Conditions favoring the development of separate streams of consciousness.		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	838		Hemispheric specialization and the expression of unconscious processes.		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	839		Dreams		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	840		Denial of illness		1
Galin; Hemispheric Specialization, Unconscious Processes	842		Unilateral electroconvulsive shock treatment (ECT)		2
Section IX	851		Consciousness as a state -- waking, deep sleep, coma, anesthesia, and dreaming.		9
	853		The waking brain		2
Moruzzi and Magoun; Reticular Formation and EEG	859		Brainstem reticular formation and activation of the EEG. (1949)		6
Moruzzi and Magoun; Reticular Formation and EEG	859		Transitions from sleep to wakefulness, or from the less extreme states of relaxation and drowsiness to alertness and attention, are all characterized by the apparent breaking of the synchronization of discharge of elements of the cerebral cortex, an alteration mark in the EEG by the replacement of high-voltage slow waves with low-voltage fast activity.		0
52 Scheibel; Substrates of Arousal	881		Anatomical and physiological substrates of arousal. (1980)		22
52 Scheibel; Substrates of Arousal	885		Relationship of the reticular core to wakefulness and sleep.		4
52 Scheibel; Substrates of Arousal	885		Substrates of selective awareness.		0
53 Bogen	891		Neurophysiology of consciousness -- an overview. (1995)		6
54 Flohr	901		An information processing theory of anesthesia. (1995)		10
54 Flohr	903		NMDA receptor channel complex.		2
54 Flohr	905		NMDA synapse as a target for anesthetics.		2
55 Alkire	913		Toward a unified theory of narcosis -- brain imaging evidence for a thalamocortical switch as a neurophysiologic basis of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. (2000)		8
55 Alkire	920		Neuroanatomic/neurophysiologic model of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.  (diagram)		7
56 Dement	929		Relation of eye movements during sleep to dream activity -- an objective method for the study of dreaming. (1957)		9
56 Dement	933		Specific eye-movement patterns and visual imagery of the dream.		4
Hobson; Brain, Dream State Generator	937		Brain as a dream state generator. (1977)		4
LaBerge; Lucid Dreaming	959		Lucid dreaming verified by volitional communication during REM sleep. (1981)		22
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	965		Dreaming and wakefulness. (1991)		6
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	969		Wakefulness as an intrinsic state fundamentally similar to rapid eye movement sleep, but specified by sensory inputs.		4
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	972		Intrinsic oscillations in the brainstem and the forebrain.		3
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		Synchronous activation in the face of spatial disparity.		1
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		40 Hz activity and cognitive conjunction.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		Synchronous activation has been observed in mammalian cerebral cortex. A visual stimulus produces coherent 40 Hz oscillations in regions of the cortex that may be separated by as much as 7 mm.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		Magnetoencephalographic recordings performed and awake humans have revealed the presence of continuous 40-Hz oscillations over the entire cortical mantle.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		Auditory stimuli having random frequency components produced a clear synchronization of 40 Hz activity.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	973		Phase comparison between the oscillatory activity recorded from different cortical regions reveal the presence of a close to 12 ms phase shift between the rostral and caudal pole of the brain.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	974		Few prosencephalic structures have extensive reciprocal connections with the cerebral cortex -- the thalamus and the amygdala constitute the best known examples.
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	977		Electrophysiological properties of the thalamocortical cells and circuit.		4
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	977		Brainstem influence on thalami firing mode.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	978		Consciousness and subjectivity are intrinsic properties of the brain		1
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	979		Rapid eye movement sleep, hallucinations, and daydreaming -- in all three cases, intrinsically degenerated activity similar to that observed in REM is rampant and does not necessarily conform to external reality.		1
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	979		Consciousness as a thalamocortical temporally dependent conjunctive state.		0
Llinás & Paré; Dreaming and Wakefulness	979		Thalamocortical activity as the functional basis for consciousness.		0
Section X	987		Theory		8
	989		Reentry, adaptive resonance, and neural nets		2
	989		Temporal correlation and binding.		0
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	991		Consciousness and complexity. (1998)		2
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	994		Differentiation		3
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	996		Integration through strong and rapid reentrant interactions.		2
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	997		Differentiated patterns of activity.		1
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	998		Functional clustering.		1
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	998		Neural complexity.		0
Tononi & Edelman; Consciousness and Complexity	999		Dynamic core hypothesis.		1
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1007		Brain learning, attention, and consciousness. (1999)		8
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1008		Adaptive resonance theory (ART).		1
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1008		ART hypothesis -- all conscious states are resonant states.		0
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1010		When we talk to a friend in a crowded and noisy room, we can usually keep track of our conversation above the hubbub.		2
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1010		Cocktail party problem.		0
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1022		Self-organizing feature map models were introduced and computationally characterized together with Christoph von der Malsburg.		12
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1022		Bayesian classifier.		0
Grossberg; Brain Learning	1025		Corticohippocampal interactions and medial temporal amnesia.		3
Taylor & Alavi; Competitive Network for Attention	1035		A global competitive network for attention. (1993)		10
Taylor & Alavi; Competitive Network for Attention	1035		Reticular nucleus of the thalamus.		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1059		Time-locked multiregional retroactivation -- a systems level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. (1989)		24
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1071		Functional regionalization.		12
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1071		The nature of representations.		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1072		Components of representations.		1
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1072		Feature-based fragments.		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1072		Structure and role of Convergence Zones.		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1073		Types of Convergence Zones.		1
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1074		Development of convergence zones.		1
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1074		Superposition of signals.		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1074		Attention		0
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1076		Relative segregation of memory domains.		2
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1077		Different levels of memory processing.		1
Damasio; Retroactivation, Recall	1078		Consciousness and self-consciousness.		1
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1087		Visual feature integration and the temporal correlation hypothesis. (1995)		9
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1087		Population coding and the binding problem.		0
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1088		Cells at higher levels of processing tend to have larger receptive fields and to respond selectively to a rather complex constellations of elementary features.		1
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1090		The probability for intra- and interariel response synchronization should reflect some of the Gestalt criteria for perceptual grouping.		2
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1090		Intracolumnar interactions.		0
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1093		Intercolumnar interactions.		3
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1095		Interaerial and interhemispheric interactions.		2
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1095		Evidence for synchrony in nonvisual structures.		0
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1099		The probability that distributed cells join an assembly should reflect the Gestalt criteria, i.e., features in images tend to group together to form objects.		4
Singer & Gray; Temporal Correlation	1100		As the features in an image change, the relationships among the activity patterns of the cells responding to those features should change in a way that reflects of the Gestalt properties of the image.		1
65 Baars	1113		Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain. (1998)		13
66 Baars	1124		How does a serial, integrated, and very limited stream of consciousness emerge from a nervous system that is mostly unconscious, distributed, parallel, and of enormous capacity? (1993)		11
Newman, Baars, Cho; Neural Global Workspace	1131		A neural global workspace model for consciousness attention. (1997)		7
Newman, Baars, Cho; Neural Global Workspace	1133		Modeling global, competitive attention.		2
Newman, Baars, Cho; Neural Global Workspace	1137		A neural model for global resource allocation.		4
Newman, Baars, Cho; Neural Global Workspace	1138		"Wagon wheel" model of CNS systems contributing to global attention and conscious perception.		1
Newman, Baars, Cho; Neural Global Workspace	1138		Basal ganglia inputs are of particular importance because they tonically inhibit activity in the superior colliculus cells. It has long been known that the frontal eye fields and posterior parietal area exert strong influences on eye movements and must be considered together with the superior colliculus in accounting for orienting of attention.		0
68 Franklin & Graesser	1149		A software agent model of consciousness. (1999)		11