Joaquín Fuster; Cortex and Mind
Book	Page		Topic
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	6		Gestalt psychologists' principal area of interest was perception, especially visual perception.
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	6		The entire object of perception emerges from the binding of elementary sensory parts; what matters to the organism is the organization, the relations between those parts.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	6		The notion of the emergence of perception from the relations between sensory elements has an enormous importance in cognitive science that will remain a lasting contribution of Gestalt psychology to the cognitive neuroscience of the cerebral cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	6		Karl Lashley (1950), a neuropsychologist, helped to establish the groundwork for an integrative view of discrimination and memory, and of cognition in general.  He conjectured that the engram is represented throughout a cortical region and that the same neurons that retain memory traces of our experience must also participate in countless other activities.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	7		Karl Lashley established the experimental foundation for distributed representation in the cerebral cortex and for the notion that it's neuronal substrate serves assorted cognitive functions.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	7		Donald Hebb (1949) postulated that short-term memory consists of reverberations of excitation in discrete cortical nets or cell assemblies with the assistance of feedback loops.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	7		Donald Hebb further postulated certain principles of plasticity in synaptic contacts that would be the basis for the formation of memory.  One of them is the principle of the temporal coincidence of sensory inputs.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Hayek's theory is the proposition that all of an organism's experience is stored in a network-like system (maps) of connections between neurons of its cerebral cortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		In their synaptic strengths, the network connections record the frequency and probability with which inputs have occurred together in the history of the organism or of its species.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Perception is an act of classification of objects by a network-like systems of connections formed by prior experience with those objects.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Throughout the cerebral cortex, association becomes the essence of sensation, perception, and memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Building upon a better understanding of cortical connectivity and the physiology of sensory areas, Edelman and Mountcastle (1978) developed their concept of cortically distributed functions, which also assumes a cortical network-like structure.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Edelman and Mountcastle theorized that learning, memory, and perception are widely distributed in interconnected cortical modules or cell-columns.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	8		Edelman (1987), largely based on analogy with evolution and immunology, launched an elaborate theory of learning that he named the theory of group selection.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	9		According to Edelman's group selection theory, groups of cortical neurons are selected from an inborn repertoire by contact with the environment, thus becoming organized to perform a variety of representational functions.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	9		Underutilized groups of network neurons recede and disappear (in accord with the evidence of postnatal recession of initially overproduced neurons and synapses).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	9		Essential for the selection and dynamic of Edelman's group selection theory is a principle of reentry, which is an almost universal rule of neural connectivity.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	9		In analogy with immune system processes, Edelman introduced in the cortex the principle of degeneracy, which states that there are several more or less effective ways for an assembly of neuronal groups to recognize an object and to act upon it.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	14		Joaquín Fuster has coined the term "cognit" as a generic term for any representation of knowledge in the cerebral cortex.  The cognit is made up of assemblies of neurons and connections between them.		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	15		Cognits, the networks of knowledge in the cortex, have immense variety in terms of their information content, their complexity, and the number and nature of their components.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	16		Perception is part of the acquisition and retrieval of memory; memory stores information acquired by perception.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	26		Migration of neurons, guided by glial fibers, from the proliferative ventricular zone to the cortical plate in the course of embryogenesis. (diagram)		10
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	28		Development of neurons in the human cortex.  (diagram)		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		Developmental increase of spines on apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons of layer 5 in the human cortex at various ages.  (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		Neocortical dendrites continue to grow after birth, mainly by elongation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		In layer 3, dendrites have been reported to nearly double in length between age 2 years and adulthood.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		In some cortical regions, Broca's area for example, dendrites grow to considerable length postnatally.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		Along the shafts of dendrites existing at birth, synaptic spines increase in number until sometime between the third and 12th month of postnatal life, when they reach their maximum; then they undergo a gradual decrease into adult life.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		The exuberant growth and attrition of neocortical elements are subject to a number of the endogenous and exogenous factors that also contribute to their final outcome in the adult.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	29		Changeux and  Danchin (1976) proposed a theory in which an excessive number of connections is originally specified between neurons. From the original redundant overstock, epigenetic factors relating to usage will select the synapses that will interconnect neurons of the definitive networks, while the rest of the overstock withers away.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	31		Fleshsig (1901) published his observations on the order of myelination of cortical fibers.  Motor cortex (Brodmann area 4) and primary sensory areas with direct sensory afferents from the thalamus show earlier myelination of the afferent and afferent axons then do the areas of association.		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	32		Fleshsig (1920) concluded that the functions of the various cortical areas develop following the sequence of their myelination.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	32		Primary sensory and motor areas become functional before association areas.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	32		Prefrontal cortex does not reach full myelination until puberty; this cortex is involved in late-developing and complex cognitive functions. (e.g. language)		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	33		Synaptogenesis and subsequent synapse reduction seem to take place concurrently and at the same rates in all regions of the neocortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	34		Along with axons, dendrites and synapses, the cortex develops its substrate for chemical transmission, which has a maturation timetable with periods of exuberance and recession.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	34		Layer 3 is the source and termination of abundant corticocortical axons and recurrent axon collaterals on pyramidal neurons.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	34		Early in fetal life, corticocortical fibers from the contralateral hemisphere reach their prefrontal destination through the corpus callosum.  Later in embryogenesis that distribution becomes topographically refined under the influence or guidance of preexisting structures, such as thalamocortical fibers.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		There is clearly a genetic plan for the development of the entire structure of the neocortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		At every step of development, the expression of the genetic plan, the structural phenotype of the neocortex, is subject to a wide variety of internal and external influences.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		Through sensory and motor interactions with the environment, the afferent, efferent, and association fibers of the neocortex will develop and form the networks that are to serve cognitive functions.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		Development of cortical networks involves a process of selection of neural elements among those that in earliest stages have been overproduced.  A degree of competition for inputs among cells and terminals is probably part of that selective process.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		In the development of cortical networks, the  neuronal elements that succeed in the competition would thrive and survive the normal attrition; others would be eliminated.  It is a kind of  Darwinian process (Edelman 1987).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	35		All of the events of neocortical ontogeny have their timetable.  Each has a critical period, a time window in which a particular set of enabling factors is essential for normal development.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		Cognitive network formation		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		The fully developed neocortex consists of a vast array of neuronal circuitry, grouped in columnar modules packed contiguously against one another. The modules fill the entire dorsal cortex of the cerebral hemispheres.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		The cortex is subdivided into a number of areas defined by cytoarchitecture, that is, by the size, shape, and vertical arrangement of their neurons.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		In certain areas, the neurons of each modular assembly are interconnected in certain ways to form a small local network, presumably representing a feature of the environment or of action upon the environment.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		Assemblies of neurons within an area are interconnected into larger networks, supposedly to represent complex features.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	36		United neuron assemblies from different areas form even larger networks that could represent even more complex features or sets of features.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	37		Functionally, the neocortex is never fully complete.  Life experience will continue to change it, especially at the synaptic level, and to increase the range of its functions.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	37		Experience will convert cortical networks into representations of the environment and of subject's actions in the environment, i.e. into cognitive representations or cognits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	37		Nature versus nurture.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	37		Selectionists maintained that cortical representation is the result of competitive selection of neural elements.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	38		The question is not whether nature or nurture, but how much nature and how much nurture.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	38		An eminently plausible selectionist model is the neuronal group selection theory proposed by Edelman (1987).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	38		Edelman's neuronal group selection theory accounts for the formation of representational networks out of preexisting neuronal populations through a selective process that takes place in close interaction with the environment.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	39		Degeneracy, a concept of immunological origin, is a critical property of Edelman's neuronal group selection theory.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	39		A degenerate response by a net is tantamount to the categorization of the features that characterize the net, which is the equivalent of the cognit.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	40		A rich sensory environment and increased sensory stimulation maintain the size and growth of dendrites and dendritic spines.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	40		Lengthening of dendrites in an "environmentally enriched" animal may be accompanied by a lower number of larger synaptic spines.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	40		Pruning of excess elements may be accompanied by the development of larger, probably more computationally effective synapses, axons, and dendrites.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	40		Central role of the synapse in making cognitive networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	40		Neocortical representations of our internal and external environments, of our internal milieu and the world around us, are built by modulation of contacts between neurons.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	41		Pyramidal neuron of the hippocampus and the various types of synaptic terminals on it.  (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	42		Principles proposed by Hebb (1949) postulates that whenever one cell (A) repeatedly takes part in the firing of another (B), "some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells" such that the efficiency of the first cell in firing the second is increased.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	42		In the mammalian hippocampus, which is phylogenetically ancient cortex, the phenomenon of long-term potentiation (LTP) is an example of the operation of Hebb's rule -- i.e. the increase in the strength of synapses by transmission of impulses through them.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	42		The tetanic electrical stimulation of the perforant pathway, a major entry of neocortical input to the hippocampus, induces an enhancement of the excitability of the synapses of dentate granule cells, upon which the path terminates.  This enhancement can persist for hours, days, or even weeks after the cessation of the electrical stimulus.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	43		Hebb's basic principles.  (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	44		Hebb did suggests a reverberation mechanism for short-term memory.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	44		Plausibility of the reverberation mechanism for working memory, which Fuster construes as a form of attention.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Average pyramidal cell has some 10,000 synapses and is embedded in a mash of connectivity of enormous complexity.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Since the average pyramidal cell in a representational network has some 10,000 synapses, what happens in individual synapses and cells is inconsequential, unless it also happens at the same time in many others synapses and cells, and unless those cells share connections with other cells.  Under these conditions, the outcome of an association of inputs is cooperative.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Transcendended cell dynamics and entered population dynamics.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Network formation in the neocortex depends to a large extent on the modulating influences from other brain structures and from neurotransmitter systems of subcortical origin.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Extracortical influences have global potentiating roles and do not per se confer representational specificity on neocortical networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Representational specificity of neocortical networks derives from the specificity of thalamic projections and the organization of corticocortical connections.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Permissive and mediating role that limbic and subcortical structures play in the formation of neocortical connections.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	45		Hippocampus, which is phylogenetically old cortex, plays a crucial role in the acquisition and consolidation of memory and thus in the construction of neocortical representations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Memory representations over 4 weeks old presumably have already been consolidated in the neocortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Hippocampus exerts its memory making role over the neocortex probably through the connections that reciprocally link the two structures through the parahippocampal gyrus.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Neocortical connectivity of the hippocampus is limited to areas of association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		No hippocampal fibers terminate or originate in primary sensory or motor cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Hippocampal connectivity reaches into large sectors of the posterior cortex of association, behind the central sulcus, and also extends to association areas of the frontal lobe, i.e. the prefrontal cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Only the associative areas of the neocortex need the input from the hippocampus for the formation of new representations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Innate characteristics of sensory and motor representations in primary cortices. At birth, these cortices contain representations of the environment and of organismic action already built into the structure.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Primary sensory and motor cortices do not need hippocampal inputs for the formation of elementary sensory and motor representations.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		Cortex of association needs hippocampal inputs in order to accommodate the new memories, and also to retrieve them before they are consolidated into long-term memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	46		A significant implication of the hippocampal-prefrontal connections is that the hippocampus, in addition to its role in memory formation, contributes to the formation of the neocortical representation of the most complex actions of the individual.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	47		Bidirectional connectivity between the hippocampus and the neocortex through the parahippocampal cortex. (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	47		Lesions of the amygdala, the most important nuclear complex of the limbic system, can cause memory deficits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	47		Amygdala's well-known role in the attribution of the emotional significance to external stimuli.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	47		Amygdala may impart to the neocortex the affective and motivational inputs that play such an important role in the registration of memories.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	47		Brodmann's area 28 is a major node of connections linking the hippocampus with associative areas of the neocortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		In both hippocampus and cortex, glutamate, through in NMDA receptors, may activate second messengers in postsynaptic cells, and thus induced protein changes that sustain LTP as well as other lasting phenomena of network formation.		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		NMDA receptors are most common in layers 2 and 3, which are the preferred terminations of corticocortical axons, and thus the potential site for corticocortical network links.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		Neural network representations in the neocortex are a continuation of a process that began with cortical evolution in ancestral mammalian species.  The phylogenetically oldest representations are those of the simplest physical features of the world and of motor adaptations to it.  They are present at birth in the structure of the primary sensory and motor cortex.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		The innate structure of primary sensory and motor cortex can be considered a form of memory that has been stored in evolution and can be retrieved as needed by the organism for adaptation to its surroundings.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		Physiological significance of critical periods for sensory and motor function.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		Thalamic terminals are essential for the proper of ontogenetic development of sensory cortex, and those in turn need sensory input for their development.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	49		The formation of neocortical networks in the developing individual is a continuation of processes that took place during phylogeny and early ontogeny in primary areas, and  in subsequent life extend into areas of association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Beginning in primary sensory and motor areas, a series of corticocortical paths toward higher associative areas can be traced anatomically.  These paths are reciprocal throughout, composed of ascending as well as descending fibers.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Neocortical networks for cognitive representation fan out into more areas and higher areas, gaining width of distribution, where they intersect other networks of different origin.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Cross-modal representation of objects -- i.e. representations across sensory modalities.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		In network formation, there is not only convergence (synchronous) but also divergence.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Divergent connections facilitate the synchronous convergence of inputs of different origin in widely dispersed areas.  [feedback for synchronization]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Both convergence and divergence have been demonstrated anatomically in patterns of fibers from occipital cortex reaching as far as the frontal lobe.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		Cognitive networks are largely self-organized by auto-association. They are formed by inputs arriving simultaneously, in temporal correlation, to cell groups of existing networks of association cortex, where those inputs established new associations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	50		New network associations are simply expansions of preexisting nets.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	55		Functional architecture of the cognit		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	60		The most obvious characteristic of perceptual categories is their hierarchical organization.		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	60		Perceptual categories are organized in cognitive hierarchies of progressive integration and generality, with sensory percepts in lower levels and abstract or symbolic percepts in higher ones.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	60		At the bottom of the perceptual categorization hierarchy are the sensory qualia of each modality.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		Perception consists in the classing of objects by the binding of characteristics that have co-occurred in the past and thus have been associated by prior experience.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		The binding of characteristics is what segregates each object from its background.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		There is a form of perceptual categorization that is not based on co-occurring sensory stimuli, but rather on sequences of them. The categorization of sequences of sensory stimuli may be viewed as a process of multiple classification over time or as the binding of temporally separate percepts (temporal integration).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		Temporal binding is extremely important in language.  It is one of the essential functions of the cortex of the frontal lobe.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		Hierarchical organization of perceptual categories does not imply that all categorizing occurs from the bottom-up.  Many associations, probably most, occur between hierarchical levels, between higher or abstract categories and lower ones,  or horizontally between higher levels.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		In adult life, hierarchical categorization of percepts probably form the dominant hierarchical organization of knowledge and the cognitive framework for it that has been laid out by early experience and education.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		Motor or executive knowledge, memory, and categories are all part of the hierarchy.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		All the actions of an organism can be categorized, from the bottom up, and stacked in a hierarchy of motor cognits.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	61		At the bottom of the hierarchy of motor cognits reside the elements of actions that are defined by discrete movements and muscle groups.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	62		Cortical Modularity		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	62		Above the cognits for discrete movements and muscle groups are the categories of action defined by goal and trajectory, and higher yet are the programs and plans.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	62		Categorization in time is paramount, especially with regarding to language.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	62		In the categorization of language, small temporally dispersed categories (e.g. phonemes) are temporally integrated into largely categories (e.g. words), and these in turn into yet larger ones (e.g. sentences), and so on up the hierarchy.  [Stereotyped motor programs]  [FAPs]		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	62		Cortical modularity		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Cortical Hierarchy of Perceptual Networks		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Pyramidal neurons of each primary sensory area -- V1 for vision, A1 for audition, S1 for somesthesis -- send axonal connections onto adjacent or nearby areas of somewhat different cytoarchitecture that constitute further processing steps for analysis within that modality.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Beyond V1 (area 17), some of these areas specialize in the analysis of such visual features as motion, shape, and color.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		All areas of the three cortical pathways dedicated to the processing of modality-specific information beyond primary cortices have been characterized as cortex of unimodal association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		All connections in the sequence of cortical areas that constitute a unimodal processing and association pathway are reciprocal.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Interarea linkages in both  directions include topologically organized parallel connections, convergent connections, and divergent connections.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Neural wiring is available for parallel processing, as well as for integration and distribution of information in both directions, i.e. bottom-up and top-down.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Each unimodal pathway, at various stages, sends long-distance projections to three broad cortical regions -- frontal lobe cortex, paralimbic cortex, and areas of multimodal convergence in parietal and temporal cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Unimodal connections to frontal cortex serves sensory-motor associations, those to paralympic cortex (gateway into the amygdala and hippocampus) served emotional associations and memory, and those to multimodal areas serve  cross-modal associations. These three sets of long corticocortical connections are reciprocal.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	67		Cortical hierarchy of our perceptual networks		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	68		Temporal and parietal areas of multimodal convergence, presumably serving intermodal association, have been termed 'transmodal areas.'		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	68		Transmodal areas include large sectors of the midtemporal cortex, Wernike's area at the junction of temporal and parietal cortices, and limbic cortex (entorhinal, parahippocampal, and hippocampal).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	69		Streams of connectivity from primary sensory to transmodal areas mark not only trails of sensory processing but also an ascending ladder in a hierarchy of representation of perceptual knowledge.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	71		The module of sensory cortex is the smallest and hierarchically lowest perceptual network.		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	71		At higher levels in unimodal association areas, sensory representation is more dispersed, cognit gestalts are larger, and the information they represent is more complex than in primary cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	71		At higher levels of the hierarchy, receptive fields are larger, and cells respond to stimuli despite wide variations of stimulus parameters.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	71		Cells of unimodal association areas are part of representational networks that encode more complex and multidimensional stimuli than the cells of primary cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	72		A cognit in unimodal association cortex is a network of cells that are interconnected to represent associated features of a complex stimulus or group of stimuli.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	72		The cognit network has been formed by prior repeated co-occurrence of constituent features -- (1) temporal contiguity, (2) spatial contiguity, (3) repetition, and (4) emotional and motivational connotations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	72		Emotional or motivational association is one of the reasons why the networks of unimodal association cortex extend into other areas; it is also a reason why the perceptual cognits of one modality are distributed beyond the region of representation for that modality.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	73		In the upper reaches of their respective hierarchies, the cortical pathways of unimodal association converge on areas of multimodal or transmodal association posterior cortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	73		The progressive expansion of knowledge categories with the upward progression of the perceptual hierarchy explains the different degrees of vulnerability to damage at different levels of the hierarchy, as well as the different consequences of damage.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	74		Cortical Hierarchy of Executive Networks		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	76		At the level of the motor cortex (M1), cell populations encode specific movements.		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	77		Representations of movement in premotor cortex (area 6) are more global and more distributed than in M1.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	82		A high-level cognit (e.g. an abstract concept) will be represented in a wide network of association cortex that has contacts with multiple lower category networks.    In that sense, cortical high-level cognits are both degenerate and complex.		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	83		Perception		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		Perceptual Categorization		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		Perceptions of the world are under the influences of the past, inasmuch is they are molded by previous memories and guided by selective attention, which, like memory, is anchored in past experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		Perception is not only under the influence of memory but is itself memory or, more precisely, the updating of memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		We perceive what we remember as well as remember what we perceive.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		Every percept is a historical event, a categorization of current sensory impressions that is entirely determined by previously established memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	84		Perception can be viewed as the interpretation of new experiences based on assumptions from prior experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	85		Selective attention, a top-down cognitive function.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	85		Attention is an aid in the categorizing function of perception.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	85		Memory based expectations of significance.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Two major components of selective attention -- inclusion and exclusion.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Inclusive component of attention is what is widely understood by focus of attention, the selection of a limited sector of sensorium for the intensive analysis of the information within it.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Exclusionary component of attention consists of the suppression of information from other sectors that may interfere with the analysis of what is in focus at the time.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Categorizing function of perception is subject to affect and value.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Trivial somatic sensations may lead to hypochondrial interpretations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Both depression and elation can induced mood congruent perceptual imagery that may well serve the creative artist.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Motivational significance of sensory stimuli with regard to personal values is a powerful attractor of attention.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	86		Emotional tone in the spoken language may lead to misinterpretation of its cognitive content.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	87		Gestalt school of psychology.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	87		Gestaltists created an eminently logical, self-contained, and testable theory of perception that explained how we identify objects and regularities in the world we sense.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	88		Gestalt psychology is of current relevance to cognitive neuroscience.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	88		Gestalt psychology has been eminently successful in shaping much of the contemporary sensory physiology and psychophysics.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	88		Gestalt psychology developed a number of principles of organization.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	88		Because of their power to explain a great variety of configurations in human cognition, the laws of Gestalt psychology have been generalized to several cognitive functions, including learning and thinking.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		How do symbols represented in the cortex become surrogates for sensory representations in cognitive operations?		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		Perception is the activation through the senses of a posterior cortical network, a perceptual cognit, that represents in its associative structure a pattern of relationships (a gestalt) present in the environment.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		Perception applies to an infinite variety of cognits at several hierarchical levels, as well as to an infinite variety of external gestalts.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		In the act of perception, sensory impulses come to a perceptual apparatus that is ready-made for them, much as in the immune system a pattern of antibodies in ready-made for a wide variety of antigens (Edelman, 1987).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		Sensory perceptual apparatus consists of a highly complex, hierarchically organized system of cortical networks, i.e. perceptual cognits, that represent established knowledge.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		Perceptual processing will be one of categorizing incoming information in accord with prior experience, by matching the new to the old and by modifying the old with the new.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		The modification function of perceptual processing will consist of synaptic changes that will expand or in some other way alter the associative structure of a cognitive network.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		In perceptual categorization, sensory stimuli are recognized (matched) by a given network because stimuli similar to them, at an earlier time participated in the formation of that network by association and Hebbian principles.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	91		Upon their recurrence, arriving stimuli gain access to the same network by a rapid -- serial and parallel -- processing through cortical paths.  As they arrive at the network and are recognized by it, they activate the network as an ensemble, the entire cognit at once.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		The rapid ignition of a distributed cortical network is the essence of rapid categorization of objects that is at the root of the dynamics of perception.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Recognition of sensory stimuli or gestalts as cognits in storage does not require a perfect match. It is sufficient that the stimuli or gestalts contain certain relationships or regularities within them that qualify them as members of the same class, the same cognit.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Degeneracy, as meant by Edelman (1987), is here a useful term.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Degeneracy implies an approximate or highly probable fit between the structure of the network, in connective terms, and the structure of the external Gestalt in relational terms.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Because of the factors of approximation and probability, and because several cognits shared common features, an incoming gestalt or part thereof can activate several networks before the best match and categorization occur.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Perceptual process of matching and categorization takes place simultaneously on many aspects of the environment.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Which networks or cognits will be activated by sensory inputs at any given moment, and at which hierarchical level, will depend on the nature of those inputs and on a series of internal factors.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		In a complex environment, several gestalts will reach perceptual systems at the same time.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		If a given Gestalt contains relationships between its elements that match relationships in an existing cognit, it will activated.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Because of associations of similarity, several networks can be activated simultaneously in a parallel process of successive match and rematch of gestalts to cognits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Familiar gestalts will quickly find their match in higher areas of association, at the semantic or symbolic level.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		New complex gestalts will undergo a more elaborate process of analysis, segmentation, and successive matchings at lower levels before their categorization at higher-level.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	92		Temporal gestalts will be integrated into the time axis before they are categorized.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Some of these categorization processes will be guided -- top-down -- by attention and may occur consciously.  The vast majority will occur unconsciously in rapid succession.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Perceptual categorization of sensory gestalts depends on the structure of the categorizing networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Cortical structure of the perceptual apparatus. -- at the lowest, most peripheral stages of cortical sensory systems, perceptual cognits are purely sensory and thus categorize information defined by the physical parameters.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Out of sensory cortex, parallel streams of cortical connectivity project to higher sensory areas, which are dedicated to the representation and analysis of sensory information of the same modality.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Connectivity between sensory cortex and unimodal higher sensory areas consists of collateral, convergent, divergent, and recurrent fibers.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		In some of these secondary sensory areas, such as area V2, cells exhibit the ability to detect illusory contours, thus obeying at least one gestalt principle.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	93		Networks in the lower unimodal sensory areas are able to categorize relatively simple percepts of the corresponding modality.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	98		If a perceptual act results in selective attention or working memory, the activation of the categorizing network will be maintained by reentry of excitation.  At the same time, other networks will be reciprocally inhibited, especially those that represent elements of context or background that are excluded from attention.		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	99		Perceptual binding is the term used by psychologist to characterize the unification of the associated sensory features of an object in the perception of that object as an identifiable (segmented) entity or gestalt.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	99		Perceptual binding is the joint activation of all of the networks neurons, whether it is induced by the presence of the entire object or by one of its associated parts.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	99		By joint activation we mean the synchronous or nearly synchronous increase in the firing frequency of the neurons that constitutes the network.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	99		Berger (1929), the discoverer of the EEG, claimed that rapidly oscillating brain waves -- in the upper beta range, ~20 Hz or higher -- could be recorded from the scalp of subjects performing mental operations, such as arithmetic.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	106		Perception-action cycle		7
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	111		Memory		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		Formation of memory		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		Any new memory is nothing more than an expansion of old knowledge.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		All perception involves remembering in that it is an interpretation of the world according to prior knowledge.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		In the process of interpretation for perception, sensory percepts are instantly classified in the light of old experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		A new percept leads to a new memory by building upon old memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		Without prior knowledge, a new percept is uninterpretable.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	112		From the point of view of neurobiology, knowledge, memory, and perception share the same neural substrate.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Memory is fundamentally an associative function.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		The basic biophysical process at the root of memory formation is to a large extent the result of the temporal association of inputs upon cells (synchronous convergence).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Bulk of individual memory is formed and stored in neuronal networks of cortex of association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Cortical memory networks are formed in and between neuronal populations or nets (cognits) by a self-organizing associative process.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Retrieval of memory -- recall, recognition, remembering -- is essentially an associative process.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Formation of the associations between cortical cell populations that make up memory networks takes place under the functional control of the limbic structures, especially the hippocampus.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	113		Epilepsy patient H.M.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	114		Cross-section of the hippocampus and adjacent midtemporal cortex. (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Attention, rehearsal, repetition, and practice are cognitive operations that work synergistically in the making or strengthening of the synapses that form the memory networks of the cortex.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Amygdala is the evaluator of the affective and motivational value of stimuli.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Synaptic modulation of cortical synapses that underpins the consolidation of memory includes inhibition as well as excitation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Making of a memory network probably involves a degree of excitation of some neuronal groups together with the reciprocal inhibition of others.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Nowhere in the central nervous system is there effective excitatory integration without some reciprocal inhibition.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Inhibition enhances contrast.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	115		Several neurotransmitters probably participate in the formation of a memory network in the cerebral cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		NMDA receptors, which are common in the cortex, are implicated in the generation of LTP, a presumptive mechanism of memory formation.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Strength of experimentally induced LTP seems to decrease is a power function of time, just as memory does.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		In the formation of a mnemonic or cognitive network, synaptic modulation takes place along many cortical pathways and in several layers of the cortical hierarchies.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Temporally coincident inputs that construct new memories can come from many sources, some external and some internal.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Among the external inputs constructing new memories, sensory stimuli and outputs from sensory processing areas are the most important.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Internal inputs constructing new memories include those from the organism's internal milieu, which through the limbic brain carry to the neocortex information on the visceral and affective connotations of sensory stimuli.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Other internal inputs contributing to the construction of new memories are those from pre-existing cognitive cortical networks, also activated associatively by sensory stimuli in the act of perception.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		In the formation of memory, there is a heterarchy of inputs.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	116		Any neuron or group of neurons anywhere in the cognitive hierarchy can become part of many memories.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Short-term memory		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Redundancy of representation, or degeneracy -- I.e. capacity of different structures to yield the same outcome.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Degeneracy accounts for the potential for recovery after injury.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Intersection and overlap of memory networks are a key to understanding the robustness of memory and the apparent non-specificity of certain amnesia's after lesions, especially in higher cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Consolidation of memory into cortical long-term nets.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Reverberation of impulses through recurrent circuits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Hebb (1949) was the first to postulate reverberation as a mechanism of memory retention.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Another plausible mechanism of memory retention is the reactivation of the modulating inputs by repetition or rehearsal of sensory impressions.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		For the reinforcement of a memory, the reintroduced inputs need not be identical to those that generated it.  Associations of similarity, perceptual or motor constancy, and symbolic representation can recreate effective inputs to enhance a memory network.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	117		Associated components of the network remain active for consolidation during their "stay" and what has been called short-term memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Two forms or stages of memory, short-term and long-term.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Short-term memory is characterized by limited storage capacity, estimated to be  a maximum of about seven items, and relatively rapid decay.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Long-term memory has unlimited capacity and a little or no decay.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Cognitive revolution of the 1960s.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Presented with a list of words, and required to repeat the words regardless of the order (free recall), can usually recall well the first words in the list (primacy effect) and the last words (recency effect), but not so well the words in the middle.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Insertion of a distracting stimuli, or of tasks between word presentation and recall, interferes with the recency effect, but not primacy.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	118		Hippocampus is necessary for the transfer of a short-term memory to its long-term permanent store.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		Distinction between short- and long-term memories, even as discrete stages if not stores of memory.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		The curve of forgetting is not inflected but monotonically gradual.  When plotted on double-log graphs, the data become straight lines.  They conform to a power function.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		Forgetting is greatly dependent on the number and complexity of items in short-term memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		Remembering is reinforced by rehearsal and impeded by distraction.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		Gradual consolidation of memory in a single store along the temporal continum.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	119		The more remote a memory, the more resistant is still electroshock.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	120		Information begins to enter permanent storage as soon as it comes in.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Perceptual memory		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		The concept of consolidation of one and the same neural substrate has gradually done away with the dual-store idea		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Evidence for the consolidation of memory in one store implicates the entire cerebral cortex and synaptic change in cortical networks as the essence of consolidation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		There is no need for different neural structures to accommodate different kinds of memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Concept of time-limited memory as an active and operant state of cortical memory -- not a short-term memory per se but is memory for the short-term.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Working memory, a function of fundamental importance for the temporal organization of cognition, speech, and behavior.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Memory can take many forms, and any memory has a mixture of contents.  Heterogeneity is a universal trait of all memories.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Heterogeneity of memory is a direct result of its associative nature.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	121		Autobiographical memory, which is commonly characterized as episodic or declarative, illustrates the heterogeneity of memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		All dated experience is an extension of previous experience, an expansion of old memory and of old knowledge.		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		New perceptual memory is made up of new perception, but given that all perception consists of the reevocation of old knowledge to interpret and classify the new, it follows that any new experience is incorporated by association into a fund of old experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		A new experience becomes an inextricable part of a vast associative cognit, a vast neural network that may contain distinctive associations with space, time, and sensorium.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		Any perceptual memory is an associative conglomerate of sensory and semantic features at many levels of the cognitive hierarchy of perceptual knowledge.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		The network representing a memory must tie together features of the same modality in unimodal association cortex and of different modalities in cross modal association cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	124		All perceptual memory of an individual rests on a layer of phyletic or innate sensory memory, i.e. the primary sensory cortices.  Above these lie networks of unimodal and polymodal associative memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	127		Executive memory		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	132		Retrieval of memory		5
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	132		Retrieval of the memory can be induced by a large variety of external and internal stimuli.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	132		Conscious awareness is a concomitant phenomena of many acts of retrieval and of memory searches as well as of attention and working memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	133		Given that most memories are essentially hierarchical, made up of cognitive contents of different hierarchical levels, and given that the memory contents at one level are better consolidated than those at another, not all contents of a memory are equally retrievable.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	133		It is well known that memories can be more easily retrieved by recognition than by recall.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	134		H.M. was found to exhibit amnesia extending into long periods of his life before the temporal lobe surgery.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	134		Presumably, the hippocampus exerts its memory retrieval role via its reciprocal connections with the neocortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	134		Dual role of the hippocampus in the formation and retrieval of memory although the mechanisms remained obscure.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	134		New memory is formed on old memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	134		Three categories of neural input can lead to the activation (retrieval) of a cortical memory network -- (1) sensory stimuli, (2) input from other memory networks, (3) inputs from the internal milieu.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	135		Memory retrieval occurs as much top-down as it occurs bottom-up.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	135		A sensory stimulus can revive a memory inasmuch as that stimulus has been previously associated with others in the formation of that memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	138		In Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome, an inherited autosomal genetic disorder, the patient is uncontrollably compelled to proffer inappropriate verbal utterances; only a fragment of motor memory seems to be repetitively retrieved and stereotypically reenacted.		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	138		Vast majority of the memories that we retrieve remain unconscious -- we perform myriad acts automatically and without being aware of them.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		Most memory retrieval is implicit.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		In neural terms, the distinction between implicit and explicit memory can only refer to relative differences in consolidation, strength of connection, and state of activation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		Priming is the facilitation of retrieval from memory by previous exposure to a stimulus that is related to the memorandum.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		The relationship in priming may be sensory, perceptual, semantic, logical, or executive.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		Priming can be appropriately understood as a result of the reactivation of the memory network -- at a subliminal level of conscious awareness -- through an associative link within itself or with other networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		The hierarchy of established memory makes any memory network accessible to plentiful priming influences.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	139		Executive memory is retrieved in much the same way as perceptual memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	140		Prefrontal cortex, especially on the right, is activated in the retrieval of various forms of perceptual memory (e.g. episodic).		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	140		It is unclear whether the role of the prefrontal cortex is to retrieve memory or to assist the executive function in integrating and organizing the cognitive information retrieved.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	140		The organization of behavior requires the continuous, orderly activation of networks of executive memory represented in the cortex of the frontal lobe and the lower structures of motor systems.  That recruitment of executive networks can only take place through the functional interplay of frontal and posterior cortices in the perception-action cycle.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	141		Heterarchy of memory networks -- heterogeneity of the hierarchical rank of their component cognits.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	141		Retrieval of the most heterarchical of all memories, the episodic autobiographical memories.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	141		The temporality of episodic memory has two aspects: --  One is the timeframe in which the remembered episode occurred, i.e. its associations with chronological age, clock, and calendar.  The other is the temporal order of the events that constituted the episode.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	141		We do not know the neural basis of either time or temporal order, i.e. of the cognits that encode them.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	141		A faithful recall of an episode preserves temporal associations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		In the act of recalling an episode, it's components cognits are activated in the order in which they occurred in the formation of the network that encoded the episode as it was experienced.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		We can estimate the cognitive components of the vast memory network that represents an episodic memory and the order of the activation of its components in the recall of the episode.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		Absence of sharp boundaries between cognits and memory networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		Construe the entire cerebral cortex as an all-encompassing web to accommodate any cognitive memory of any kind.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		Empirical evidence indicates that within the global cortical web, there can be exquisite specificity of representation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		Exquisite specificity cortical representation arises from two basic assumptions: (1) any neuron population within the web can be connected, directly or indirectly, with practically any other and (2) the strength of neuron connectivity between them can vary greatly in terms of the number of fiber connections and in terms of synaptic bond.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		From the enormous richness of anatomical relations between cortical neurons and a wide range of the strengths of those relations derive the immense capacity and specificity of human memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	142		With the retrieval of memory, whether in free recall, in recognition, or in the pursuit of a behavioral goal, cortical activation would spread from one part of that global web to another as a wave of association in a giant connectionist network.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	143		Attention		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	143		Behaviorism considered attention an irrelevant or intractable subject.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	143		It was not until the 1950s, with the advent of information theory, that attention reemerged as a worthy subject of experimental psychology and, eventually, of cognitive science.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	144		Biological roots of attention		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	145		Attentional control allocating resources need not come from the very top.  Under ordinary circumstances, to treat ordinary stimuli, rapid and automatic control may come from is lower structures, without involvementof the executive networks of the frontal lobe.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	146		Feedback control is accompanied by feedforward control. Whereas feedback modulates sensory processing stages, feedforward modulates proactively motor processing stages, priming the motor system for more efficient action.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	146		One universal rule of inhibition is to enhance the role of excitation.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	147		Reciprocal interplay of excitation and inhibition in sensory and motor systems.  (diagram)		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	148		From the cooperative duality of excitation and inhibition come the two basic operations of attention: -- (1) enhancing the processing within a discrete sector of sensorium, motility, or cognition and (2) reducing or suppressing the competing others.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	149		Perceptual attention		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	155		Working memory		6
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	164		Executive attention		9
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	165		Sensory attention depends to a large extent on the allocation of very important motor resources, namely, the neural apparatus that controls the direction of gaze and the orientation of the head.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	167		Set and expectancy		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	177		Language		10
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	178		Neurobiology of language		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	184		Hemispheric lateralization		6
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	186		Cortical areas of the left hemisphere implicated in language.  (diagram)		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	190		Neuropsychology of language		4
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	190		The principal source of knowledge on the neural foundations of language has been to clinical study of cortical aphasias, the disorders of language that result from lesions of the cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	190		Lesions in Wernicke's area tend to cause deficits in the semantics of language.  The patient has difficulty understanding the meaning of words and sentences but little difficulty articulating them; in fact, the patient may spontaneously engage in profuse and illogical speech production.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	191		Broca's aphasia has difficulty articulating words and sentences.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	191		The most characteristic feature of Broca's aphasia is the absence of function words (e.g. articles, pronouns, conjunctions, and prepositions).  To the listener, the speech of  Broca's aphasia sounds telegraphic and agrammatical.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	191		Pure aphasias of any kind are rare.  Language is an eminently integrative function and none of its components, phonological, semantic, while syntactic, can operate normally in isolation on the others.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	192		Broader definition of Wernicke's area includes associative cortex for stimuli other than those of the auditory modality.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	192		Wernicke's cortex lies high in the perceptual hierarchy, situated above unimodal association cortex and including portions of transmodal cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	192		Broca's cortex lies relatively low in the executive hierarchy, in premotor cortex and possibly also in motor cortex at the foot of the precentral gyrus which controls the oral musculature.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	192		Broca's area is closer to speech output than Wernicke's area is to speech input.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	192		Lesions of Wernicke's area can cause deficits not only of language but also of higher cognitive and conceptual functions.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	193		It would appear, from lesion studies, that the semantic substrate for language is the same substrate that serves perception and perceptual memory.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	193		The substrate serving perception and perceptual memory consists of the cortical hierarchy of cognitive networks representing all the cognits accessible to language.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	193		At the lowest stage of the language cortical hierarchy, in auditory association cortex (area 42), are the phonological cognits or networks formed by associations between vocal sounds; at higher cortical stages are the cognits formed by associations between phonemes and stimuli of other modalities, especially visual, to constitute words; and in the highest areas of transmodal association cortex are the categorical and conceptual cognits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	193		The productive substrate for language seems to coincide with the substrate that serves action and executive memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	195		Functional architecture of semantics		2
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		Cortical dynamics of syntax		11
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		The word syntax derives from a Greek verb meaning to join or put together.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		How does the brain impart order to the structure of phrases and sentences to give them precise meaning?		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		The ordering function of syntax is largely the work of the cortex of the frontal lobe.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		The order of syntax is a temporal order.  The speaker or writer provides meaning to sentences by ordering words in the temporal domain.  That temporal ordering is the essence of syntax.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		Prosody is an important coadjutant.  Semantics and lexicon provide the elements to be ordered for meaning.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		How cognits and verbal symbols, which have a distributed cortical topography, are timely selected and ordered to impart meaning to language.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		Question is how spatial order in the brain is converted into temporal order in language.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	206		spatial-temporal conversion is what Lashley (1951) called "the translation from the spatial distribution of memory traces to temporal sequence."		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	207		The role of the prefrontal cortex in the temporal organization of behavior has been extensively documented.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	207		Hierarchical organization of syntactic functions in the lateral cortex of the frontal lobe.  It appears that Broca's area plays a key role in the elementary grammatical syntax.  This role is to some degree innate and thus part of what has been characterized as a universal grammar.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		Some parts of the premotor cortex in the left or dominant hemisphere seem to provide coordination of the more complex, though largely routine, automatic speech.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		The lateral prefrontal cortex, bilaterally, not only constitutes a reservoir of executive cognits, but also serves as the means to access those cognits in the construction of novel and elaborate language.  It's role transcends speech and writing and extends to the temporal organization of behavior in general.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		The purposeful expression of language, like the execution of goal-directed action, is preceded by the mental formulation of a broad plan or schema of the intended production.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		The executive-linguistic network will activate lower executive networks, initiating the expression of language and the syntactic process.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		Access to memory and lexicon implies the associated activation, in an orderly manner, of a set of cognits and their lexical counterparts.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	208		Efficacy of the frontally driven access of syntax to lexicon depends on the strength of the connections within and between the lexical networks of association cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	209		Each of the lexical networks of association cortex would tend to gravitate into fixed-frequency states.  In those states its neurons will fire at more or less regular frequencies determined by the recurrent connectivity that constitutes the network.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	209		Disorders of memory (e.g. dementias) may entail the loss of access to lexical networks that can result in a paraphasia, i.e. in the activation of associated words but not the most appropriate word at the moment.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		In syntactic constructions, frontal networks interact with posterior cortical networks in a continuous interchange.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		Whereas both frontal and posterior networks provide the lexicon, frontal networks, in addition, provide the grammar.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		Frontal contribution to syntax takes place at various levels.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		Broca's cortex contributes the most elementary syntax, whereas higher-level frontal cortices contribute propositional syntax.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		As the syntactic process is engaged in the integration of longer and more elaborate speech constructions, working memory becomes a syntactic function.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		Syntax is temporal order, and temporal order in speech requires the temporal integrative functions of the frontal cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	210		The temporal integrative functions of the frontal cortex are essentially two: (1) working memory, and (2) preparatory set, which are both forms of attention (one retrospective and the other prospective)		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	213		Intelligence		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	213		The complexity of intelligence arises from its close relationship with four other functions -- perception, memory, attention, and language.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	213		The difficulty of defining intelligence derives from the almost infinite variety of its manifestations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	213		Here, intelligence is defined as the ability to adjust by reasoning to new changes, to solve new problems, and to create value in new forms of action and expression.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	213		The pertinent data from cognitive neuroscience indicate that intellectual performance can be best understood as a result of neuronal transactions between perceptual and executive networks of the cerebral cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	214		Development of intelligence		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	214		It is beyond dispute that animals are capable of intelligent behavior and of certain essential cognitive functions that mediate it.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	215		Intelligence is the processing of cognitive information toward cognitive or behavioral goals; the degree of intelligence is the efficiency with which it can process that information.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	215		In phylogeny as well is ontogeny, the development of intelligence is closely correlated with the development of the cerebral cortex, in particular those cortical areas that are designated cortex of association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	216		In human adults, rigorous studies have failed to show any clear correlation between measures of intelligence and measures of cortical structure, either at the microscopic or macroscopic level.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	216		Measures of cortical anatomy may fail to reflect the true structure of intelligence, as this may reside in imponderable elements of cortical circuitry (e.g. synaptic density).		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	216		By contemporary methods of measurement, the cortex of the genius does not differ significantly from that of the average human being.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	216		According to one child development expert, the intellect of a child undergoes four distinct stages of development: -- (1) birth to two years is the sensory -- motor stage, (2) age 2 to 7 is the representational stage, using the verbal domain to represent the external world; (3) age 7 to 11 is that of concrete operations, erector sets, skillful games and sports, etc.; age 11 to 15 is the stage of formal operations using hypothetical reasoning to test alternatives.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	217		By age 15 a child becomes capable of temporally integrating information and constructing temporal gestalts of logical thought and action toward distant goals.  Language has become essential for the formulation of propositions in the construction of those goal-directed gestalts.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	217		Inhibition requires the exclusionary aspect of attention that is deemed essential for the formulation of percepts, memories, and patterns of relation with the world.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	217		The development of logical constructs proceeds with the development of inhibitory suppression of distracting sensory inputs, of alternate constructs, and of conceptually competing categorizations.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	217		Sequential engagement of progressively higher levels of the hierarchy of neural structures that are dedicated to the integration of cognits and action.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		Whereas some constituents of the lower levels of cortical hierarchy may be inhibited, others may be used to contribute the integration of the more automatic actions to the higher gestalt of behavior, language, or logical thinking.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		Perception-action cycle is the circular processing of information between posterior and frontal cortices in the integration of sensory -- motor behavior, as well is in higher cognitive activities such as language.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		In the perception-action cycle, a posterior tier of hierarchically organized associative sensory areas is reciprocally connected with a corresponding frontal tier of associative motor areas.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		In the integration of behavioral or cognitive actions in the perception-action cycle, a continuous flow of neural processing takes place through and between those areas at various hierarchical levels.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		The feedforward integration of actions at the higher levels of the cortical hierarchy is assisted by continuous feedback signals from the environment through the posterior (sensory) areas.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		Reciprocally connected at the top of their perception-action cycle, are the lateral prefrontal cortex and the posterior cortical areas of polymodal sensory association.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		It is through the connectivity at the top that the prefrontal cortex plays his temporal integrative role in the construction of novel plans of behavior.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	218		It is also through the connectivity at the top, as well as to outputs to lower motor structures, that prefrontal cortex controls the execution of plans.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	219		It is the functional cooperation of cognits at the top of the perception-action cycle that enables the formation of intricate behavioral sequences, logical constructs, and elaborate sentences.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	220		Anatomy of intelligence		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	220		Forms of intellectual performance commonly investigated by cognitive scientists: (1) analytical intelligence, based essentially on reasoning; (2) practical intelligence, based on problem solving abilities largely acquired by ordinary life experience; (3) creative intelligence, based on conceiving, imagination, and intuition.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	224		Reasoning		4
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	236		Decision making		12
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	242		Creative intelligence		6
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		Creative intelligence develops from all other cognitive functions. It develops from a broad base of knowledge, implicit and explicit, that was acquired in the past by attention and perception and symbolized by language.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		A special role of the right hemisphere in certain aspects of language and in visuospatial perception.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		A special role of the right hemisphere for creative intelligence, in particular spatial creativity.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		Many studies make it evident that the right hemisphere contributes creative power to the brain.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		Logical and linguistic capabilities of the left hemisphere have been shown to be considerably assisted by the functional integrity of the right hemisphere.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	243		Important role of the cortex of the frontal lobe, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in particular, in several crucial aspects of creativity.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		To create, is to make new cognits out of old ones.		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		At the root of the creative process is the formation of new associations between old cognits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		Like all forms of decision-making, the cortical creation of new cognits necessitates the inputs from subcortical structures.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		Subcortical structures, notably in the limbic system and the brain stem, provide to the creative process inputs from drive, motivation, and attention.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		Subcortical influences from the internal milieu and the world of affect enter the executive cortex mainly through afferent connections to the dorsolateral and cingulate prefrontal cortices.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		Subcortical influences communicate tone to the neocortex through monoaminergic neurotransmitter systems of subcortical origin.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		Not only is creativity energized by influences from affect, but then creativity, possibly by feedback through reward systems of the basal brain, induces predictable changes of affect.  Rather well-known are the affects of creativity in allaying anxiety and uplifting mood.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	246		From the limbic system and neocortex itself come the excitatory inputs from value systems that facilitate and maintain the process of creative intelligence.  Included in those systems are the neural networks that represent a wealth of social, aesthetic, and ethical values, which can be reasonably assumed to be partly innate and partly acquired.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	247		The biophysical essence of creativity is a dynamic process of formation of new associative contacts between cognits.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	247		The ignition of neuronal assemblies can shift in succession from one network to another, leaving a trail of synaptic facilitation in wide expanses of cortex. The creative recruitment of cognits takes place on the prefrontal control and has the objective of organizing, i.e. integrating, new executive cognits.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	250		It is that quality of integration, as it pertains to perception, that makes Gestalt phenomenonology such an appealing method for the cognitive neuroscientist.		3
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	250		We are conscious of our percepts because these are the result of the integration of elementary sensations into categorical perceptual wholes. Conventionally, such categorical wholes or gestalts have been explored in the spatial domain.  They constitute the central topic of the gestalt psychology of visual perception.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	250		Whereas spatial gestalts are easy to demonstrate and amenable to study by a neurophysiological methods, it is the temporal dimension that provides a phenomenal presence to the perceptual gestalt, whether spatial or non-spatial.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Working memory is the internalized attention on a recent percept for prospective action, and thus the persistent activation of the cognitive network that represents that percept.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		The recall of any memory is conscious by definition.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Imagining is conscious and that it consists essentially of the conscious retrieval of long-term memories and established cognits, assembled and reconfigured in a variety of ways.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Creative intelligence is served by the conscious interaction of memory and imagination. In all likelihood, that interaction rests on sequences of reentrant functional linkages between posterior and frontal cortices.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Impulses of limbic origin related to affect or motivation can activate cognits in posterior cortical areas, which in turn feed inputs into the prefrontal cortex.  Then, by way of top-down feedback, the temporal integrative and planning functions of the prefrontal cortex arranged those cognits in new ways, creating new structures of action of aesthetic or social value.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		While we deal in daily life, recognition is by and large a more prevalent form of memory retrieval than recall.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		As perception and is the focus of attention, it becomes conscious.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Consciousness emerges from complex interactions between three cognitive functions: (1) perception, (2) memory, and (3) attention.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	251		Attention -- we are consciously aware of what we attend to.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		Attention is commonly treated as synonymous with consciousness.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		The neural correlates of attention are frequently interpreted as the neural correlates of consciousness.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		Attention is the cognitive function that relates consciousness most directly to cortical physiology.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		Any content of attention possesses a phenomenal attribute of spatial and temporal unity.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		Through attention, all perceptual and motor aspects of language and intellectual performance have access to consciousness.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	252		Attention is the cognitive function that most discretely and intensely activates a network from which consciousness emerges.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	253		The cortical networks activated by the performance of a sensory -- motor task may extend across both hemispheres.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		Working memory can be best characterized as a critical part of the remembered present, which Edelman (1989) identifies with consciousness.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		It is reasonable to assume that the conscious awareness of a cognit coincides with the temporary activation of its cortical network while it is being retained in working memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		Electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies indicate that the cortical topography of working memory coincides with the topography of the cognit retained in working memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		A percept must be in focus for a minimum of 200 ms to inner consciousness.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		The stream of consciousness would consist of an uninterrupted succession of temporary activation of cognits and their networks.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	254		The processing of information in cortical networks can take place without giving rise to conscious experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Much of the processing may be unconscious.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		The activation of a cortical network and the processing of information may not reach a high enough level or process long enough to yield conscious experience.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Activation of the network above the threshold for consciousness would serve the focus of attention and coincide with what Tononi and Edelman (1998) call the dynamic core.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		When the focus of attention or the dynamic core of consciousness resides in a given network to maintain the cognit it represents in working memory, there must be cortical and corticothalamic mechanisms that keep the network persistently active. The most plausible such mechanism is reentry.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Hebb was the first to postulate a role of reverberating reentry in recurrent circuits for sustaining visual short-term memory in occipital areas.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Reentry is emerging as the key mechanism and working memory.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		The most plausible computational models of working memory have recurrent network architecture.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Working memory, according to some of the computational models, would consist of the sustained reentry of excitation between the associated components of the cognitive network that represents the mnemonic content of the cortex.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	255		Prefrontal cortex, because of its substantiated role in the top-down control of other structures for attention and working memory, has been considered a putative neural seat of consciousness.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	256		Prefrontal cortex does not appear to contribute to consciousness any more than any other cortical region.  Any portion of neocortex can generate conscious phenomena as a participant in cognitive function.		1
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	256		The neocortical contribution to consciousness varies from one time to another and from one area to another.		0
Fuster; Cortex and Mind	256		Conscious experience can change accordingly in a wide variety of ways as neural activity migrates within and between the many potential cortical networks that we call cognits.		0
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