Stuart
Hameroff, et.al.; Science of Consciousness I |
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Topic |
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Chalmers;
Problem of Consciousness |
5 |
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Consciousness
is the most baffling problem in the science of the mind.
There is nothing that we know more
intimately than conscious
experience, yet there is nothing that is harder to explain. |
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Chalmers;
Problem of Consciousness |
6 |
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The really hard
problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. |
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1 |
Chalmers;
Problem of Consciousness |
7 |
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Sometimes terms such as
"phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are used, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience"
or simply "experience." |
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1 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
248 |
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To be aware of an object or an event, the brain
has to construct an explicit, multilevel, symbolic interpretation of part of a visual scene. |
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241 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
248 |
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By symbolic, as applied to a neuron, we mean that a neuron's firing is strongly correlated with some feature of the visual world
and thus symbolizes it. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
248 |
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Whether a neural
symbol is best thought of as a scalar (one neuron) or a vector (a group of closely
associated neurons as in population coding in the superior colliculus) is a difficult
question. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
248 |
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Awareness
results from the firing
of a coordinated subset
of cortical (and possible thalamic) neurons that fire in some special manner for a certain length of time, probably for at least 100 or 200 ms. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
248 |
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Neuronal firing for awareness needs to activate some type of short-term
memory by either strengthening certain synapses or
maintaining an elevated firing rate or both. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
249 |
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Assuming that the semiglobal activity that
corresponds to awareness
has to last for some minimum time (of the order of 100 ms) and that events within that time
window are treated by the brain as approximately simultaneous. |
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1 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
249 |
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Unless a neuron has an elevated firing rate and unless it fires as a member
of an (usually temporary) assembly, it's firing
will not directly symbolize some feature of awareness. |
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0 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
249 |
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Both physiological and
psychophysical studies have shown that movement is extracted early in the visual system as a primitive. |
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0 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
249 |
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"Kanizsa triangle"
illusion, in which three
Pacmen are situated at the corners of a triangle, with their
open mouths facing each other. Human
observers see a white triangle even though the intensity is constant between the Pacmen. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
252 |
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Primary visual cortex at its connections. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
252 |
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It is unlikely that information sent along the pathway from V1 to the superior colliculus, responsible for controlling and initiating eye movements, can produce visual awareness. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
253 |
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Hypothesizing that the activity in V1 does not directly enter awareness. |
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1 |
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
253 |
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What does enter
awareness is some form of neural activity in certain higher
visual areas, since they do project directly to frontal areas. |
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Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness |
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