Stuart Hameroff, et.al.; Science of Consciousness I
Book Page   Topic                                
Chalmers; Problem of Consciousness 5 Consciousness is the most baffling problem in the science of the mind.  There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, yet there is nothing that is harder to explain.
Chalmers; Problem of Consciousness 6 The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. 1
Chalmers; Problem of Consciousness 7 Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are used, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience." 1
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 248 To be aware of an object or an event, the brain has to construct an explicit, multilevel, symbolic interpretation of part of a visual scene. 241
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 248 By symbolic, as applied to a neuron, we mean that a neuron's firing is strongly correlated with some feature of the visual world and thus symbolizes it. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 248 Whether a neural symbol is best thought of as a scalar (one neuron) or a vector (a group of closely associated neurons as in population coding in the superior colliculus) is a difficult question. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 248 Awareness results from the firing of a coordinated subset of cortical (and possible thalamic) neurons that fire in some special manner for a certain length of time, probably for at least 100 or 200 ms. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 248 Neuronal firing for awareness needs to activate some type of short-term memory by either strengthening certain synapses or maintaining an elevated firing rate or both. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 249 Assuming that the semiglobal activity that corresponds to awareness has to last for some minimum time (of the order of 100 ms) and that events within that time window are treated by the brain as approximately simultaneous. 1
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 249 Unless a neuron has an elevated firing rate and unless it fires as a member of an (usually temporary) assembly, it's firing will not directly symbolize some feature of awareness. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 249 Both physiological and psychophysical studies have shown that movement is extracted early in the visual system as a primitive. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 249 "Kanizsa triangle" illusion, in which three Pacmen are situated at the corners of a triangle, with their open mouths facing each other.  Human observers see a white triangle even though the intensity is constant between the Pacmen. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 252 Primary visual cortex at its connections. 3
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 252 It is unlikely that information sent along the pathway from V1 to the superior colliculus, responsible for controlling and initiating eye movements, can produce visual awareness. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 253 Hypothesizing that the activity in V1 does not directly enter awareness. 1
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness 253 What does enter awareness is some form of neural activity in certain higher visual areas, since they do project directly to frontal areas. 0
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness
Koch; Neuronal Substrate of Visual Consciousness