Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes; Using Humor to Reverse Engineer the Mind |
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Topic |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
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Neural
mechanism of Humor |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
23 |
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Laughter is
neither necessary nor sufficient for humor. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
24 |
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Mirth is
the response to humor. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
24 |
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Mirth --
alternatively called amusement or hilarity -- is, like most emotions, is a graduated phenomenon. It ranges
from a gentle tinkling of the mind to an intense and overwhelming emotion. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
27 |
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Our objective is to understand what humor is and how it operates in the brain. We
will first strive to discover the universal features that seem to coincide
with a feeling of mirth. |
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3 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
27 |
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There is a similarity between
the joy of humor and the joy
of problem-solving. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
27 |
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When we "get"
a joke, we feel a sense of discovery, rather like the sense
of triumph when we solve the problem. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
27 |
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When we are unable to solve a problem, there is a sense
of confusion or missing knowledge that is reminiscent of the feeling we get
when we are unable to "get" a joke. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
53 |
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Surprise theories |
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26 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
53 |
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Some theories claim that surprise is at least a necessary
feature of humor, if
not sufficient. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
53 |
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Surprise is
typically defined as the characteristic emotion caused by something unanticipated. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
54 |
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What surprises us is not unexpected things, but rather things we expected not to happen, because we
expected something else to happen instead. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
61 |
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It is very hard to see what puns, slapstick, classic comedy, and dirty jokes have in common, aside from being (potentially) funny. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
61 |
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No topic is intrinsically
comic. The content requirement must be something
to do with how the content is derived, obscured, used, or misused, i.e. it
must be a function of the cognitive processing of the content. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
61 |
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Since the dynamics is so important, there must be conditions of humor that
depend (somehow) on the actual physical, "mechanical" properties of
operation of this cognitive processing: the variable speed of processing, the variable rate of
increasing arousal, the variable intensity and duration of phases in the
processing, etc. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
62 |
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The innate neural system for cognitive processing of humor must have been retained by evolution to perform
some substantially important cognitive task. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
62 |
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The innate
neural system for cognitive
processing of humor is ubiquitous in human beings, and its activity is powerfully
rewarding. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
67 |
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We are born curious. We are informavores. Our hunger for novelty derives us to fill our heads with
facts we might need
someday. |
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5 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
67 |
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Humans
evolved with a hardwired preference for high energy food. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
67 |
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Humans are
suckers for cuteness.
Our perceptual-motivational systems have a bias for infant faces that serves those infants well when
they depend on our willingness to give their care and protection a higher priority. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
69 |
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Emotions
have valence; they
are positive or negative. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
71 |
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A number of emotions such as anger, giddiness, or guilt often seem to last
uninterruptedly for at least hours, if not days. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
72 |
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An emotion is an internally induced pleasure or pain -- a valenced perception -- caused by a
variety of processes of transduction of
information in the world. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
72 |
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A memory or a thought may awaken a feeling, or a feeling may reference a memory. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
73 |
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Higher emotions are corporeal feedback systems that provide valenced assessment of contents
that do not have direct sensory transducers. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
79 |
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Boredom has
its place in driving us out from cognitive malaise. |
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6 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
79 |
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Curiosity
inspires our cognitive apparatus into detailed exertions surrounding particular as-of-yet unexplained
irregularities. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
84 |
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Behavior is
driven principally by a reward system that, while perhaps neurologically
complicated, is phenomenalologically comprised simply of the passions. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
97 |
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Theorists of cognition have long postulated various mental
structures -- frames,
scripts, schemas -- designed to render learning and comprehension more efficient. |
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13 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
97 |
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A mental
space is a region of working
memory where activated
concepts and percepts are semantically connected into a holistic
situational comprehension model. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
97 |
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Frames, scripts, and schemas or other idealized cognitive
models can be thought of as data structures resident in long-term memory and ready to use whenever needed. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
97 |
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Mental spaces
are constructed during comprehension
tasks as well as doing abstract
and creative thought. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
97 |
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Conceptual blending in which spaces are combined through mappings to provide creative,
comprehensible combinations in thought, maintaining separate referents in multiple spaces. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
98 |
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In a complex
mind, such as a modern
non-infantile human mind, mental spaces act as containers that delineate regions of thought. This
is what enables us to daydream while watching a movie and keep both separate from each other, as well
as separate from our ongoing sense of reality. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
98 |
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Studies of attention indicate that perhaps only one
mental space can be active
at a time, but that we may quickly and with little effort slip back-and-forth between them. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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Humans regularly predict the
meaning of an ambiguous sentence fragment and then readjust that mental space as disambiguating information arrives. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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As each
word in a sentence arrives, the mental space is built incrementally and augmented to model the full set of data then available. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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Not just sentence
comprehension but also the situation and event comprehension operate incrementally in a unified continuous system. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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Comprehension
is always accomplished by a "holistic"
attempt to integrate the information from all sources that has arrived in the brain up until that point. When further information (from any semantic source) arrives that can disambiguate an earlier piece of
information, the model
is adjusted accordingly. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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During the process of comprehension, the mind does not wait passively until it has "enough"
information in a buffer
to complete the disambiguation of what it has so far received
but rather attempts to disambiguate
by assumption until proven
otherwise. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
99 |
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The predictions involved in building sentence
comprehension may be "educated" assumptions due to
quite explicit noticing
of a telling feature,
local priming that makes one
possibility appear more likely than another, or
they may be due to a subliminally learned
statistical regularity that suggests the likelihood of one meaning rather
than another. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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The term "spreading
activation" has been used somewhat loosely
among modelers in cognitive science because the notion can be applied to many kinds of models. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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We are going to use a model of just-in-time spreading activation
(JITSA) -- a process that can account for intuitions and approximate the structure of frames
without requiring their existence as fundamental entities. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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Initial semantic contents are activated by sensation in working
memory mental spaces,
and the process of perception and any deeper thought ensue from the diffuse triggering of related semantic contents and interference patterns therein. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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Researchers don't
yet know how to implement in neural structures a system of JITSA that can detect contradictions or even maintain enough consistency to be
a reliable updatable store of world knowledge. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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We are assuming
at this time that the brain's
functional architecture will prove to bear a
useful resemblance to the JITSA system model. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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Taking inspiration from a wide variety of exploratory work
in cognitive science,
we are supposing that the brain can be modeled as a JITSA system with the information handling
capacities we describe, and then looking at how humor could emerge from such a system. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
101 |
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Borrowing a term from software engineering, "just-in-time (JIT) processing" is an economic model of processing (or thought) in which computation is not performed until
the moment it needs to be, i.e. on-demand. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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People generate a bounty of pertinent anticipations about the
world. |
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1 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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Experiences
we have at hand are the result of current situation-pertinent thought
or recollections of other pertinent-at-the-time
thoughts each of which are the result of JITSA. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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We expect
future events to fall
in line with our experiences and with such inferential anticipations as we
have had occasion to create now or during historical
comprehension of events. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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Thanks to evolution by natural selection, expectations
created by JITSA happen
to be, on the whole, the most relevant
anticipations, out of an infinite space of logically possible thoughts. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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The relevance of anticipations follows
for the simple reason that these anticipations are most
applicable to precisely
the environment from which they have drawn. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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Just-in-time processing can be performed
piecemeal, in keeping with the comprehension of data. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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We think of a functional near-equivalents of frames being grown by JITSA in a large network of meaningful nodes. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
102 |
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Via probabilities and associations already incorporated into the strengths and proximities in the network, the spreading
activation has the capacity to take on the functional structure of a particular instantiation of a frame,
with chains of nested conditional probabilities. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
103 |
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The speed created by the parallel
processing of spreading
JIT activations in the brain causes an illusion of cognitive completeness
in working memory, or
frame illusion, as we
might call it. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
103 |
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The frame
illusion is due to the simple fact that comprehension, thought, and recall happened
so fast that we seem to have instantaneous access to a number of elements about any situation or thought as if all the details are already actively loaded into working memory. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
103 |
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In reality, some
details will be strongly
activated, some will be on the fringe, and some details will not be activated at all. Yet, all of these things are instantly accessible upon the slightest inquiry because of the capacity for JIT
activation. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
104 |
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The JITSA
model provides a foundation for the interfaces of cognition that are necessary for humor. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
104 |
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A belief is a commitment to a fact about the world. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
105 |
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Working memory beliefs are the most important beliefs -- these are the contents of mental spaces. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
105 |
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Long-term memory beliefs are better seen as acquired dispositions to have particular active working memory beliefs. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
105 |
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We have learned
things in our lives that dispose us to a likelihood of activating certain beliefs in working memory under certain circumstances of spreading activation. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
105 |
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Consider long-term
memory as a sort of surrogate
world; just as the external
world is a vast
source of information that, thanks to our sensory systems, triggers active beliefs when
attended to, so long-term memory is a source of additional
information, not
currently perceivable in
the external world but readily
available on-demand. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
106 |
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To be surprised by something, it must have been unexpected. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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A committed
belief in working
memory is likely to become a committed belief in long-term memory. |
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5 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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A committed
belief in long-term
memory is a disposition to construct future active
beliefs and use those contents in acts of reasoning. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Allowing this ballooning process of committed beliefs between long-term memory and working memory to continue
unchecked when one of our committed beliefs just
ain't so, can generate
a cascade of false beliefs resulting in a substantially faulty world representation. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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The information
we ultimately remember
from an experience is not
a high-resolution copy of the experience, however
vivid it may have been,
but rather a low-resolution transformation of the experience in which much
of the original context has been lost to compression. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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If recall leaves out contextual information, debugging an error later
discovered in a descendent belief becomes difficult. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Try to catch false beliefs before they become compressively
encoded, while we still
have the context to work on them, and before we
end up with a disposition to reactivate that false belief. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Evolution
has provided ways to avoid false beliefs by exploiting our epistemic
emotions. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Confusion
helps us to detect conflicts in working memory, thus casting doubt upon the conflicting beliefs and allowing them to be expeditiously
reviewed for repair. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Detecting
an improper
commitment before it has a chance to create a long-term memory belief can protect us from the whole
string of faulty
inferences. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
111 |
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Proposed as the original purpose of humor -- the
very important task that pays for its expensive reward system by protecting us from epistemic catastrophe. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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Conflict and Resolution |
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1 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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We kill it just is a conflict when there is a contradiction between active belief elements in working memory. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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Conflicts
between beliefs in long-term memory can lie dormant side by side, unrecognized. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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It is only went conflicts in long-term memory can be brought into the same working memory space -- awakened, not transported -- that two beliefs can participate and epistemic
conflict. |
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0 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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Three possible outcomes to an epistemic conflict. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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In unresolved
conflicts we find ourselves confused and both pieces of information are stored with the conflict between them noted, such
that recollecting one of the beliefs will rather easily often bring
its uncertainty and the other conflicting beliefs to mind. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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In cooperative
resolution we may find a way to accept the truth of both beliefs
through a creative insight that dissolves an apparent
contradiction into a compatibility. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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In uncooperative
resolution, one of
the beliefs will survive while the other is destroyed. |
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0 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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Any two
beliefs, no matter how they were originally
derived, may participate in a conflict, but getting them to participate in the conflict is often the outcome of hard work -- or luck. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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A whole
society can be blissfully ignorant of the contradictions harbored in their "common knowledge" until
some reflective and industrious thinker rubs their noses in the quandary --
or some chance event
draws everyone's attention to the problem. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
112 |
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We each have our
own scientific agenda:
rooting out and fixing
the residual conflicts
in our personal world knowledge. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
117 |
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Mirth is
the pleasure in unearthing a particular variety of mistake in active
belief structures. |
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5 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
117 |
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Basic humor
is any semantic circumstance in which we make a mistake in active belief structures and succeed in discovering the mistake. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
118 |
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The incessant generation of mental spaces in the course of our daily lives appears
to us to be effortless
and automatic and,
indeed, involuntary. |
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1 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
118 |
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JITSA
constructs framed-like structures on the fly,
with all their accumulated baggage, and these temporary
data structures contribute efficiently to our sense of what is happening, and, more importantly, our sense
of what is about to happen. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
118 |
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It is only the information that gets introduced covertly -- without drawing attention to itself on arrival -- into the mental space whose discovery elicits mirth. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
119 |
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Accumulation of "world knowledge" is an opportunistic process that includes
plenty of unnoticed inclusions -- i.e. items that are not
consciously considered and accepted. |
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Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
121 |
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Humor is
what happens when an assumption is epistemically committed to in a mental space and then discovered to have been a mistake. |
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2 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
122 |
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The epistemic
emotions all share a similar
ineffable quality of being mental feelings -- but mirth and discovery are particularly similar, in being the
two most familiar positively valenced members of this class of emotions. |
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1 |
Hurley,
Dennett, Adams; Inside Jokes |
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