Laureys & Tononi; Neurology of Consciousness
Authors	Page		Topic
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	6		Varieties of Consciousness
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	6		Consciousness is a momentary creation of neural patterns, which describes a relation between the organism, on the one hand, and an object or event, on the other.		0
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	7		Core consciousness is a prerequisite for the focusing and enhancement of attention and working memory; enables the establishment of explicit memories; is indispensable for language and normal communication; renders possible the intelligent manipulation of images (e.g., planning, problem solving, and creativity).		1
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	7		Core consciousness    is not based on language,    is not equivalent to manipulating images    in planning,    problem solving,    and creativity.		0
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	7		Core consciousness depends on wakefulness.		0
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	7		Varied cell groups in the brainstem modulate wakefulness by ascending projections to the cerebral cortex.		0
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	8		Core Consciousness		1
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	8		Extended Consciousness		0
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	9		Extended consciousness    requires working memory    and explicit long-term memory    (including both semantic and episodic memories).		1
Damasio & Meyer; Consciousness Overview	12		From an evolutionary perspective,    core consciousness came to exist    when second-order maps    first brought together the representation of the organism    modified by perceptual engagement    with the representation of the object.		3
Laureys, et.al.; Functional Neuroimaging	31		Functional Neuroimaging		19
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	44		The term 'consciousness' has a number of different connotations    ranging from awareness of one's perceptions and sensations    to self-awareness, the perception of oneself    as a responsible agent that is endowed with intentionality and free will.		13
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	44		Phenomenal awareness -- the ability to be aware of one's perceptions and intentions.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	44		Because sensory signals can be readily processed and influence motor responses    without being consciously perceived,    the cognitive operations leading to conscious experience    are likely to differ from straightforward sensory-motor processing.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	45		One mechanism for dynamic binding    is the precise synchronization of neuronal responses    that occurs when neuronal populations    engage in well synchronized oscillatory activity    in the beta and gamma frequency range.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	46		Synchronized oscillations    are strongly reduced or missing    when the brain is in states that are incompatible with conscious processing.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	47		Attention related facilitation of synchronization.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	48		A close correlation between response synchronization and conscious perception has been found in experiments on binocular rivalry.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		Synchronization occurs    in a variety of distinct frequency bands    and has been found in all sensory modalities.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		Synchronization in the high frequency range (beta and gamma oscillations)    has been observed in the olfactory system,    and virtually all of the cortical areas,    the hippocampus,    and the basal ganglia.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		Synchronization also plays a role in the linkages between the cortical assemblies and subcortical target structures    such is a superior colliculus in the pool of motor neurons in the spinal cord.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		The earliest event distinguishing conscious and unconscious processing is not the power changes of oscillations but in their phase locking.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		Local gamma oscillations had the same power in the conscious and unconscious condition.  What distinguished these two conditions was the global synchronization of local gamma oscillations.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	49		Conscious processing requires a particular dynamical state of cortical networks that is characterized by a brief episode of very precise phase locking of high frequency oscillatory activity.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		An attractive hypothesis is that the transient event of perfect synchrony resets the multiple parallel processes to a common time frame, allowing for global integration and representation of information provided by sensory input and internal stores.		1
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		The global theta rhythm that follows the triggering event could provide the timeframe for the integration.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		In the hippocampus and in the neocortex, slow oscillations in the theta range have been found to be coupled to the coexisting beta and gamma oscillations.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		It is hypothesized that a local coordination of computations within specific cortical areas is achieved by fast ticking clocks, such as beta and gamma oscillations, while global and sustained integration of local results is achieved at a slower pace by low-frequency oscillations in the theta range.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		These hypotheses would allow the brain to represent the results of numerous parallel computations at different temporal and spatial scales, whereby the two dimensions would be intimately related.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		The more global the representation, the longer the timescale for the integration of distributed information.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		It is perhaps more than mere coincidence that the duration of subjected presence corresponds approximately to the cycle time of theta rhythms.		0
Singer; Neuronal Synchronization	50		Consciousness    appears to be an emergent property    of a specific dynamical state    of the cortical network --    a state that is characterized by a critical level    of precise temporal coherence    among responses of a sufficiently large population    of distributed neurons.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	53		Neural Correlates of Visual Consciousness		3
Rees; Visual Consciousness	55		Binocular rivalry is a paradigm    to study the neural correlates of consciousness.		2
Rees; Visual Consciousness	55		When dissimilar images    are presented to the two eyes,    they compete    for perceptual dominance    so that each image    is visible in turn    for a few seconds    while the other is suppressed.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Neural competition    during rivalry    may have been resolved    by later stages of visual processing.		1
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Activity in ventral visual cortex    is correlated with contents of consciousness.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Studies of ambiguous figures    have provided evidence to suggest the involvement    of areas of frontal and parietal cortex    in visual awareness.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Cortical regions whose activity reflects perceptual transitions    include ventral extrastriate cortex,    and also parietal and frontal regions    previously implicated in the control of attention.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Activity in frontal and parietal cortex    is specifically associated with perceptual alternations    during binocular rivalry.		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	56		Parietal and frontal regions    are active during perceptual transitions    occurring while viewing a range of bistabile figures    (such as the Necker cube and the Rubins face/vase).		0
Rees; Visual Consciousness	57		Hallucination is a sensory perception    experienced in the absence of an external stimulus    (as distinct from an illusion,    which is a misperception of an external stimulus induced by context).		1
Rees; Visual Consciousness	57		In contrast to hallucinations,    illusions are misrepresentations of external stimuli.		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	66		Four-Fold Classification of Percepts and Behaviors (table)		9
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	68		Attention without Consciousness		2
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	68		Consciousness in the Absence of Attention		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	68		We are always aware of some aspects of the world around us,    such as its jist.		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	68		In the 30 ms    necessary to apprehend the gist of a scene,    top-down attention cannot play much of a role    (because gist is a property associated with the entire image).		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	69		Processing without Top-Down Attention and Consciousness		1
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	72		A philosopher has argued for the existence of two different types of consciousness -- phenomenal (P) and access (A).		3
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	72		Phenomenal consciousness    is the ephemeral feeling of seeing yellow, different from the feeling of seeing green.		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	72		Access consciousness includes the processes that access information and do something with it, such as a verbal or motor report or working memory.		0
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	74		Much action    bypasses    conscious perception and introspection.		2
Tsuchiya & Koch; Consciousness and Attention	74		Anyone who skis mountain trails,    plays a piano,    or drives an automobile home on 'automatic pilot,'    knows that  stereotyped sensory-motor skills -- dubbed zombie behaviors -- require rapid and sophisticated sensory processing.		0
Raichle; Intrinsic Brain Activity	81		Human brain is approximately 2% of the weight of the body and yet accounts for 20% of its energy consumption.		7
Raichle; Intrinsic Brain Activity	85		A prominent feature of fMRI    is that the unaveraged signal is quite noisy,    prompting researchers to average their data    to increase the signal to noise ratio.		4
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	89		Consciousness nearly fades during deep sleep early in the night,    and returns later in the form of dreams.		4
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	89		During sleep, the brain goes through an orderly progression of changes in neural activity, epitomized by the occurrence of slow oscillations and spindles.		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	90		Sleep Stages and Cycles		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	91		Sleep patterns change markedly across the lifespan.		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	91		All-night recording of five sleep cycles.  (diagram)		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	92		Major brain areas involved in initiating and maintaining wakefulness (diagram)		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	93		Neural Correlates of Wakefulness and Sleep		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	95		Consciousness in Sleep		2
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	96		NREM Sleep		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	96		REM Sleep		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	98		Dreams -- Consciousness in the Absence of Sensory Inputs and Self-reflection.		2
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	100		Internal generation of a world-analog.		2
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	100		Ability to dream requires the ability to imagine.		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	101		Many dreams are characterized by high degree of emotional involvement,    especially fear and anxiety.		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	101		REM sleep is associated with a marked activation of the limbic and paralimpic structures    such as the amygdala,    the anterior cingulate cortex,    the insula,    and the medial orbitofrontal cortex.		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	101		Neuropsychology of dreaming.		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	103		Daydreaming		2
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	103		Lucid Dreaming		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	103		Sleepwalking		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	104		REM Sleep Behavior Disorder		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	105		Narcolepsy and Cataplexy		1
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	105		Narcolepsy is characterized by daytime sleepiness (sleep attacks).		0
Tononi; Sleep and Dreaming	105		Cataplexy (muscle weakness attacks).		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	109		During sleepwalking, the eyes are open and staring, patients can speak and answer to questions, usually in an incomprehensible manner.		4
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	109		Sleepwalkers are difficult to awaken,    and when awakened, they appear confused.     They may return spontaneously to bed    and lie down.		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	109		There is usually no recall of sleepwalking episodes.		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	110		Sleepwalking appears between the ages of 5 and 15 years, with a peak around 8 -- 12 years.		1
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	110		Childhood sleepwalking usually disappears around puberty.		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	110		Duration of sleepwalking ranges from 1 -- 3 to 7 -- 10 minutes, rarely longer.		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	110		Patients are typically difficult to be awakened during a sleepwalking episode.		0
Bassetti; Sleepwalking	110		Episodes of sleepwalking often end with the patient returning to bed.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	118		Consciousness is widely held to be a neurobiological property of the brain.		8
Alkire; General Anasthesia	118		Without a brain there is no consciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	118		Anesthesiologists chemically induce a temporary reversible state of unconsciousness for surgery.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	118		Anesthesiologists manipulate levels of consciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	118		On rare occasions, patients having general anasthesia for surgery will remain conscious and aware during their operation, while appearing to be completely anesthetized.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	124		Brain imaging studies provide no definitive answer as to where anesthetics first work to cause unconsciousness.		6
Alkire; General Anasthesia	124		Temporal dynamics are far too slow to clarify which region (i.e. thalamus or cortex) is affected first by anasthesia and thus could be considered the primary cause of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	124		A number of empirical findings support the hypothesis that the main effect of anasthesia occurs in the cortex.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	125		Researchers studying Parkinson's patients    found indications that anesthetics first 'turn off' the cortex    well before    'turning off' the thalamus.		1
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		The decrease in relative thalamic activity    found in brain imaging studies of anasthesia    occurs as a direct result of a decreased corticothalamic feedback to the thalamus.		2
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		The process by which anesthetics suppress arousal and   cause unconsciousness    likely involves a complex network of interacting components of the brain's arousal systems,    for which the thalamus is but one (perhaps central) component.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		The posterior cingulate and medial parietal cortical areas    are of some interest as potential neural correlates of consciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		A number of the anesthetic agents suppress activity in the posterior cingulate and medial parietal cortical areas.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		The posterior parietal regions have been noted to show a relative decrease in functioning during altered states of consciousness, such as during the persistent vegetative state and sleep.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		A functional disconnection of the posterior brain regions within frontal brain regions appears associated with the unconsciousness of the persistent vegetative state, and restoration of connectivity between these regions has been associated with return to consciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		The posterior brain regions, especially the posterior cingulate area, are involved in memory retrieval.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		Some evidence links the activity of the posterior brain regions,    especially the medial parietal lobes,    to the first-person perspective of consciousness.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		Long-established link between neglect syndromes and parietal damage.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	127		Recent work has shown that the posterior cingulate and the medial posterior parietal areas seemed to be involved in the generation of the baseline functional state of the human brain.  One interpretation of this baseline concept is that the brain regions are active as a reflection of a person's self-conscious state when the brain is not involved in any specific cognitive task.		0
Alkire; General Anasthesia	131		English chemist Sir Humphrey Davy experimented on himself on the day after Christmas in the year 1799 regarding the nature of a newly discovered gas nitrous oxide.		4
Young; Coma	137		Coma is a state of unarousable unconsciousness due to the disfunction of the brain's ascending reticular activating system (ARAS), which is responsible for arousal and the maintenance of wakefulness.		6
Young; Coma	137		Anatomically and physiologically, ARAS has a redundancy of pathways and neurotransmitters; this may explain why coma is usually transient (seldom lasting more than three weeks).		0
Young; Coma	137		Emergence from coma is succeeded by outcomes ranging from the vegetative state to complete recovery, depending on the severity of damage to the cerebral cortex, the thalamus or their integrated function.		0
Young; Coma	138		For practical purposes, coma includes    failure of eye opening to stimulation,    motor response no better than simple withdrawal type movements,    and a verbal response no better than simple vocalization of non-word sounds.		1
Young; Coma	139		There are numerous encephalopathies due to oxygen and organ failure.		1
Young; Coma	143		Concussion is a transient loss of consciousness after a blow to the head.		4
Young; Coma	143		Concussion    is often accompanied by an anterograde post-traumatic amnesia (the inability to lay down new memories for a variable period (minutes to days) after the injury)    plus or minus a shorter period of retrograde amnesia that precedes the injury.		0
Young; Coma	143		In concussion,    brains are often morphologically normal.     Since structural lesions are not essential,    concussion appears to be more a disturbance of function than of structure.		0
Young; Coma	145		Locked-in Syndrome		2
Young; Coma	148		Brain Death		3
Bernat; Brain Death	151		Brain death is the common colloquial term for the determination of human death by showing the irreversible cessation of the clinical functions of the brain.		3
Owen; Vegetative State	163		Vegetative State		12
Owen; Vegetative State	164		Patients in the vegetative state are awake,    but are assumed to be entirely unaware of self and environment.		1
Giacino; Minimally Conscious State	173		Minimally Conscious State		9
Giacino; Minimally Conscious State	173		Clinicians specializing in the care of patients with severe brain injury are well acquainted with the clinical features of coma and vegetative state (VS).		0
Giacino; Minimally Conscious State	173		Coma and vegetative state    are characterized by the complete absence of behavioral signs of self and environmental awareness.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Locked-in Syndrome		18
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Patients in locked in syndrome (LIS) are selectively deefferented,    i.e. have no means of producing speech, limb, or face movements.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Usually the anatomy of the responsible lesion in the brainstem is such that locked-in patients are left with the capacity to use vertical eye movements    and blinking    to communicate their awareness.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Classical LIS is characterized by total immobility except for vertical eye movements    or blinking.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Incomplete LIS permits remnants of voluntary motion.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	191		Total LIS results in complete immobility including all eye movements combined with preserved consciousness.		0
Gosseries; Locked-in Syndrome	193		Long-term survival in LIS is rare.		2
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	204		Consciousness and Dementia		11
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	204		Information integration theory of consciousness -- consciousness corresponds to the brain's ability to rapidly integrate information.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	204		The brain's ability to integrate information requires a well functioning thalamocortical system.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	204		Extensive legions of the thalamocortical system are usually associated with a global loss of consciousness, such as that seen in comatose patients.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	204		Patients who have undergone surgical section of the corpus callosum for therapeutic purposes leading to a splitting of the thalamocortical system, consciousness is split.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Neural activity that correlates with conscious experience appears to be widely distributed over the cortex, indicating that consciousness is based on optimal functioning of a distributed thalamocortical network rather than on the activity of a specific single cortical region.		1
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Lesions of selected cortical areas    result in the impairment of specific submodalities of conscious experience,    such as the perception of faces,    but do not produce any alterations of global consciousness.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementing disorders of the elderly, affecting more than 5% of individuals aged 65 and older in almost one out of two individuals over at over 85 years of age.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Alzheimer's disease shows a progressive,    multivariate    and irreversible deterioration    of cognitive abilities.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Disturbances of attention and memory    typically the first clinical manifestations    in patients with Alzheimer's disease.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Cognitive impairment is due to the development of neuropathological processes characterized by the presence of senile plaques,    neurofibrillary tangles    and loss of neurons    and their synaptic projections.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Neuropathological lesions affect mostly the neocortical association areas    of the parietal, temporal and frontal lobes and limbic regions    and show a regional distribution that may vary among individual patients.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Typically, the neuropathological process starts in the medial temporal lobe structures, including the entorhinal cortex and hippocampal formation,    and subsequently spreads to the neocortical association areas    of the temporal, parietal and frontal lobes, leading to the disruption of various mental functions.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		PET studies to  measure regional cerebral glucose metabolism and blood flow in patients with Alzheimer's disease examined at rest (eyes patched, ears plugged, no sensory stimulation) as well is during a variety of cognitive tasks.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Measures of both cerebral glucose metabolism and blood flow    are reliable indices of neuronal synaptic activity,    as they reflect the brain's metabolic need for glucose and oxygen in order to produce ATP.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		ATP in the central nervous system is mostly required for the maintenance and restoration    of ionic gradients and cell membrane potentials    due to electrical activity    associated with action potentials and transmission of impulses from neuron to neuron.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Changes in synaptical activity lead to changes in the demand for ATP and, in turn, for glucose utilization and capillary blood flow.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Cerebral glucose metabolism is impaired in Alzheimer's disease.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Regional cerebral glucose metabolism measured at rest is significantly reduced in patients with Alzheimer's disease.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Alzheimer's disease regional cerebral glucose metabolism    is reduced mostly in association neocortical areas,    with a relative sparing of primary neocortical and subcortical regions and cerebellum, at least until the later stages of the disease.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	205		Metabolic abnormalities worsened with the progression of dementia.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	206		Cerebral metabolic alterations are heterogeneous.		1
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	206		Patterns of cerebral metabolic alterations are related to patterns of cognitive impairment.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	206		Distinct cognitive and cerebral metabolic features characterize clinical subtypes of Alzheimer's disease.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		Regional functional connectivity is altered in Alzheimer's disease.		1
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		The correlation coefficient between the regional cerebral metabolic rates for glucose provides a measure for the functional association between distinct brain regions.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		The pattern of interregional correlations reflects the integrated cerebral activity either at rest or doing a specific cognitive task.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		Brain Gets Lost in a Degenerative Dementia		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		Patients with Alzheimer's disease    or with another similar dementia syndrome    become more and more unaware of the world and of themselves,    until they eventually slide in a meaningless present    with a fading past    and no future.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	207		Lack of awareness for the disease, anosognosia, or loss of insight are used interchangeably to indicate a patient inability to properly recognize their clinical condition, as is frequently observed in patients with Alzheimer's disease of frontotemporal dementia.		0
Pietrini; Consciousness and Dementia	214		Awareness of what happens around us and of ourselves is rooted in the complexity of the functional and anatomical networks of the thalamocortical system that enables the brain to rapidly integrate information.		7
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	247		Conscious information processing depends on synchronous network activity in the brain.  The same network that evolved for the generation of normal consciousness can be exploited by abnormally intense synchronous discharges, leading to epileptic seizures.		33
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	248		Epileptic seizures cause transient, dynamic deficits in consciousness that can range from mild impairment of attention to complete behavioral unresponsiveness.		1
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	248		Epileptic seizures are usually classified as either partial, meaning that they involve local regions of the brain, or generalized, meaning that they involve widespread regions of the brain bilaterally.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	248		Impaired consciousness is seen in generalized seizure types, such as absence (petite mal), and tonic-clonic (grand mal) seizures as well is in partial seizure types, namely complex partial temporal lobe seizures.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	248		Despite the differences between absence, tonic-clonic, and complex partial seizures, they all share a common thread of impaired consciousness.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	248		The three seizure types cause changes in (1) the upper brain stem and medial thalamus; (2) the anterior and posterior cingulate, medial frontal cortex, and precuneus; (3) the lateral and orbitofrontal cortex, and lateral parietal cortex.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		Consciousness depends on a network of cortical and subcortical structures.		1
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		Consciousness has long been separated into structures necessary for controlling the level of consciousness, and those involved in generating the content of consciousness.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		Here we define the 'consciousness system' as those structures necessary for maintaining: (1)  the alert awake state, (2) attention, and (3) awareness of self and the environment.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		The consciousness system at a minimum includes regions of the frontal and parietal association cortex, cingulate gyrus, precuneus, thalamus (especially the medial, midline, and intralamina nuclei), and multiple activating systems located in the basal forebrain, hypothalamus, midbrain, and upper pons.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		For the consciousness system, some researches would also include the basal ganglia and cerebellum due to the possible roles in controlling attention.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	249		Much prior work has demonstrated the importance of the midline subcortical structures and association cortex in normal consciousness.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	250		In the absence seizures, awareness briefly vanishes.  Typical absence seizures consist of staring and unresponsiveness, often accompanied by subtle eyelid fluttering or mild myoclonic jerks.  Duration is usually less than 10 seconds.		1
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	250		Absence seizures occur most commonly in childhood.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	250		Absence seizures can occur in susceptible individuals up to several hundred times per day.		0
Blumenfeld; Epilepsy	253		Complex Partial Seizures		3
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		Research over the past 45 years on split-brain patients have revealed unique specialized processes in each hemisphere, including some recently discovered specialized processes in the right hemisphere.		8
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		Split-brain patients' talking left hemisphere consistently denies any change in their conscious experience as a result of severing the corpus callosum.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		The experience of split-brain patients is indicative of a conscious system that is comprised of thousands of specialized local circuits.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		One of several qualities that make split-brain patients so astonishing is that they seem utterly unaware of their special status.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		For split-brain patients, the loss of the ability to transfer information from the left hemisphere to the right hemisphere and vice versa seems to have no impact on their overall psychological state.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	261		In split-brain patients, the left brain does not seem to miss the right brain, despite recent discoveries of several specialized properties in the right hemisphere.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Consciousness does not constitute a single generalized process can but is an emergent property that arises out of hundreds if not thousands of specialized systems (modules).		1
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Brain's specialized modules consist of neural circuitry specialized to process-specific domains of information.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Specialized neural circuitry enable the processing and mental representation of a specific aspect of conscious experience, and these circuits are widely distributed throughout the brain.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Many of these specialized circuits may be directly connected to some of the other specialized circuits, but not to most of them.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Each specialized circuit competes for attention.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		From moment to moment, different modules or systems will win the competition for attention and serve as the neural system underlying that moment of conscious experience.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		This dynamic moment-to-moment cacophony of systems comprises our consciousness.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		It appears to us as if our consciousness flows easily and naturally from one moment to the next with a single, unified, and coherent narrative.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Our sense of a unified experience emerges out of a particular specialized system call the 'interpreter,' which coordinates and continually interprets and makes sense of our behaviors, emotions, and thoughts.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		The interpreter appears to be uniquely human and specialized to the left hemisphere.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		A peculiar phenomenon that has been observed in a variety of neurological patients to deny that anything is wrong with them despite the clearly observable effects of the brain injury.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Anosognosia -- the unawareness or denying the existence of a brain injury deficit.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Anosognosia observed in many neurological disorders is indicative of a conscious system that is bound by the inputs of thousands of specialized local modules.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Left hemisphere specialization that is referred to as the 'interpreter' that unifies and interprets our conscious experience.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		A well-known example of anosognosia is often found in hemispatial neglect patients.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Anosognosia from hemispatial neglect is usually caused by a stroke to the right parietal lobe that causes disruption of attention and spatial awareness of the left side of space.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Damage to most areas of the nervous system that result in the impairment or loss of function will be noticed immediately by patients.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		Neglect patients, with damage to the right parietal lobe that also result in hemiplegia (paralysis to the left side of the body), deny their paralysis because these patients no longer have the mental representations of the existence of the left side of their body.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	262		For neglect patients, with hemiplegia (paralysis to the left side of the body), there is no system to sense that something is wrong, so the patient assumes that everything is normal.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	263		Reconcile current awareness with a memory of the pre-lesion awareness.  A neglect patient may draw a picture of their home, but the picture they draw will only include the right side of their house.		1
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	263		For neglect patients, the visual information that was originally encoded in the brain is still available, but that information is neglected when memory systems attempt to retrieve it.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	263		There are possibly hundreds of specialized systems in the human brain, from basic systems of perceptual processing (like discriminating tones and perceiving faces) to more higher-order systems (like recognizing emotions, sympathizing with others, and detecting cheaters).		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	263		Just as the voices in a head of a schizophrenic patient can seem to them as real as the perception of actual voices, many distortions caused by brain injury can become incorporated into our conscious experience and not seem out of place.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	263		Damage that specifically affects specialized memory systems that code for the familiarity of places and locations may increase the familiarity for otherwise novel or relatively new locations.  These patients form delusional beliefs.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		In split-brain patients, most functions remain intact after the right hemisphere is disconnected from the left, including verbal IQ and many problem solving skills.		3
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		The Left Hemisphere Interpreter -- Unifying the Conscious Experience.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		According to Gazzaniga's model of consciousness, there maybe hundreds, if not thousands, of modules contributing to our conscious experience, each contributing specialized bits of information.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		Even though there may be thousands of modules contributing to our conscious experience, our phenomenological experience will naturally flow from moment to moment, depending on the demands of the environment, as one unified and coherent experience.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		Gazzaniga believes that this unified and coherent experience of consciousness is due to a specialized process in the left hemisphere that he refers to as the 'interpreter.'		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		The interpreter is a specialized system that makes sense of all of the information bombarding the brain, interpreting our responses -- cognitive or emotional to what we encounter in our environment, asking how one thing relates to another, making hypotheses, bringing order on of chaos, creating a running narrative of our actions, emotions, thoughts, and dreams.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		The interpreter is the glue that keeps our story unified and creates our sense of being into a coherent, rational agent.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		Gazzaniga and colleagues first demonstrated the left hemisphere's unique drive to interpret the world around it using the simultaneous concept tests on a split-brain patient.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	266		The specialized system in the brain that is driven to interpret is adaptive on an evolutionary scale because it allows the individual to quickly adapt to a wide range of unexpected events in the environment.		0
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	267		A function of the interpreter extends to the realm of problem-solving.  The ability to make interpretations is a great problem-solving tool and very advantageous.  However, when the sequence of events is purely random, then the drive to look for patterns and to formulate a hypothesis about the events can be suboptimal.		1
Gazzaniga; Left Hemisphere/Right Hemisphere	267		We are driven to form hypotheses    and to look for patterns    even when it is not warranted.     Randomness tends to be a very difficult concept for humans, and a particularly difficult phenomenon for the interpreter.		0
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	271		Several neuropsychological syndromes    contain marked dissociations,    which permit the identification of principles    related to the neurophysiology of consciousness.		4
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	271		Visual phenomenal consciousness    is the aspect of consciousness    most frequently investigated    in neuroscience.		0
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	271		Through the exploration of neuropsychological syndromes    such as 'blindsight,'    visual form agnosia,    optic ataxia,    visual hallucinations,    neglect,    and split-brain cognition,    the author highlights five general principles    and explains how their generality has been demonstrated in healthy subjects    using conditions such as visual illusions of subliminal perception.		0
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	271		A scientific model of consciousness    based on the concept of a 'global workspace.'		0
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	272		Scientific investigation of consciousness, a major ongoing effort.		1
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	273		Multiple representations of the visual world elaborated by different visual brain areas    (from retina and lateral geniculate nuclei    to ventral occipito-temporal    and dorsal occipito-parietal pathways    in addition to superior colliculus mediated    visual pathways).		1
Naccache; Visual Consciousness	273		Influential publication of Crick and Koch who proposed, mainly on the basis of neuro-anatomical data,    that neural activity in area V1    does not contribute    to the content about phenomenal consciousness.		0
Postle; Hippocampus, Memory,  and Consciousness	326		Hippocampus, Memory,  and Consciousness		53
Postle; Hippocampus, Memory,  and Consciousness	332		Semantic knowledge    that is independent of the episodes    in which the information was learned.		6
Butler & Zeman; Transient Amnesia	339		Transient Amnesia		7
Nichelli; Aphasia	352		Aphasia		13
Pietrini; Blindness	360		Blindness and Consciousness		8
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	375		Neurology of Consciousness -- Overview		15
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	377		There have been claims that consciousness only emerges with language, though it seems preposterous to suggest    that infants and animals are unconscious automata.		2
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	378		Consciousness and Attention		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	379		Consciousness and Memory		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	380		The brain employs multiple maps of external space,    some unimodal, some multimodal,    many in the cerebral cortex,    especially but not exclusively in parietal lobes,    but some also in thalamus and colliculi.		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	381		Consciousness and Space -- Neglect		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	382		Consciousness, Body, and Self		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	382		The narrative, autobiographical self --    the one that characterizes in a fundamental sense who we are.		0
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	385		Consciousness and Anosognosia		3
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	386		Global Alterations of Consciousness		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	386		Sleep		0
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	387		Anasthesia		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	388		Coma and Vegetative States		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	388		Coma -- an enduring sleep-like state of immobility with eyes closed from which the patient cannot be aroused.		0
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	389		Seizures		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	390		Neuroanatomy of Consciousness		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	390		The only conclusion that can be drawn for sure about the neural substrate of consciousness    is that it includes parts of the corticothalamic system.		0
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	391		The reticular activating system    appears to have the role of an on-off switch    rather than a generator of consciousness.		1
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	391		Even widespread cerebellar lesions or oblations hardly affect consciousness, yet this cerebellum has even more neurons than the cerebral cortex, and is strongly connected in both directions with thalamus and cortex, and often shows selective activation during cognitive tasks and in relation to emotion.		0
Tononi & Laureys; Neurology of Consciousness	391		The thalamus is sometimes considered as a seventh layer of cortex.		0