Metzinger; Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Book Page   Topic    
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 17 What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 18 Background state of consciousness 1
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 19 Contents of consciousness 1
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 24 Necessity and Sufficiency 5
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 24 Mimimal sufficiency 0
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 26 Ordinary functioning brain and ordinary environments 2
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 27 Normal brain, unusual inputs 1
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 27 Normal brain, varying brain stimulation 0
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 28 Abnormal functioning due to lesions 1
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 32 An NCC should be understood as a minimal neural system that correlates with consciousness. 4
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 32 We should constrain the search for the NCC by aiming to find a neural correlate that is as small as possible. 0
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 32 Given a broad system that appears to correlate with consciousness, we need to isolate the core relevant parts and aspects of that system that underlie the correlation. 0
Chalmers; What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness 33 Distinguish NCCs for background state and for content. 1
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The amygdala is a complex of many different nuclei and is reciprocally connected with the associative cortex, particularly with the orbitofrontal prefrontal cortex (either directly or via the medial dorsal thalamic nucleus) and the hippocampal formation. 48
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The amygdala    strongly influences    the sensory (visual, auditory, gustatory) cortex. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The amygdala    receives subcortical input    from the olfactory system,    the limbic thalamic nuclei,    and the rest of the limbic system. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The amygdala is in control of autonomic responses (via the hypothalamus). 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 For cognitive and emotional functions,    the amygdala is an important center (together with the anterior cingulate cortex)    for evaluating and perhaps storing a negative experience,    such as in the context of fear conditioning and anxiety. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The hippocampal formation    and the surrounding parahippocampal,    perrirhinal,    and entorhinal cortex    are import centers for the formation and consolidation of traces of the declarative memory in the cortex. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The basal ganglia    are involved in the subconscious planning and final decisions    to take voluntary action    under the influence of the limbic system. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The basal forebrain-septal nuclei complex    is connected reciprocally    with the hippocampus and the amygdala,    as well as with centers of the reticular formation. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The basal forebrain is believed to be involved in the control of attention and of activity of a neocortical neuronal network. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The mesolimbic system    (nucleus accumbens,    lateral hypothalamus,    ventral tegmental area) is characterized by the neuromodulator dopamine. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The mesolimbic system    has strong connections with the orbital frontal cortex    and is involved in the formation of positive memories and pleasure,    and perhaps in the control of attention    in the context of new events. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 All parts of the brain    outside the cortex    contribute substantially to consciousness    while their activities remain completely unconscious. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 Although activity in the cortex    is necessary for consciousness,    we are unaware of processes going on in the primary and secondary    sensory and motor areas of the cortex. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 We are aware only of processes    bound to the activity of the cingulate and the associative cortex,    and even then of only some of those processes. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The cingulate cortex    (Brodmann areas 23 and 24) is that part of the cortex which surrounded subcortical parts of the telencephalon and the thalamus. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The cingulate cortex    is tightly connected    to the prefrontal and parahippocampal cortex,    basal forebrain-septal region,    the amygdala,    the limbic thalamic nuclei,    and the reticular formation. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The anterior part of the cingulate cortex    is involved in the sensation of pain    and in memory of painful events. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The cingulate cortex may be the conscious counterpart of the amygdala. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 81 The cingulate cortex is always active    for tasks requiring attention. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The association cortex is the portion of the cortex that contains no primary sensory or motor cortical areas,    but is involved in the "higher" processing of information coming from these areas. 2
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The left posterior parietal cortex (PPC)    is involved in symbolic-analytic information processing,    mathematics,    language,    and interpreting drawings and symbols. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The right PPC deals with real and mental spatial orientation,    the control of hand and eye movement,    change of perspective,    and control of attention. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The associative superior and middle temporal cortex houses perception of complex auditory stimuli,  including Wernicke's semantics speech center,    which is crucial for the understanding and production of meaningful written and spoken language. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 Perception of music    usually involves the right medial temporal cortex. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The inferior temporal cortex (ITC)    is decisive for complex visual information    regarding non-spatial properties    of objects and scenes,    along with their meaning and correct interpretation. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The prefrontal cortex (PFC)    includes the largest portion of the cortex (about 30% in man)    and has been viewed by many neuroscientists at the highest brain center    and the seat of consciousness,    personality,    intelligence. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 Usually, two major parts of the prefrontal cortex    are distinguished in primates:    a dorsolateral portion and a ventral-orbitofrontal portion. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The dorsolateral PFC appears to be involved in    (1) attention and selective control of sensory experience;    (2) action planning and decision-making;    (3) temporal coding of events;    (4) judgment and insight, particularly with respect to reality;    (5) spontaneity of behavior;    (6) strategic thinking;    (7) associative thinking;    (8) working memory. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The dorsolateral PFC is predominantly, though not exclusively, oriented toward the external world and its demands, including short-term memory. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The orbitofrontal PFC    is involved in social and emotional aspects of behavior,    ethical considerations,    divergent thinking,    risk assessment,    awareness of consequences of behavior,    emotional life,    and emotional control of behavior. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 Damage to the orbitofrontal PFC results in loss of interest in important life events,    and loss of "ego,"    in "immoral" behavior,    and in disregard of negative consequences of one's own behavior. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The orbitofrontal PFC is predominantly oriented toward the internal emotional and social aspects of life. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The supplementary motor area (SMA) is situated between the medial aspect of the motor cortex and the dorsomedial frontal cortex,    and represents something like an associative motor cortex. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 The supplementary motor area (SMA) is active during the preparation and planning    of complex movements    and during imagined movements. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 Together with the prefrontal cortex,    the SMA contributes to the awareness of being the author of one's own deeds. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 83 Different parts of the association cortex contribute in different ways to the great diversity and content of consciousness,    including awareness of external and internal sensory events;    consequences of one's own behavior;    autographic, body, and ego identity;    action planning;    and authorship of one's own deeds. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 87 All tetrapod vertebrates have brains that are very similar in the general organization and even in many details. 4
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 87 Body size appears to be the single most important factor    influencing brain size. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 88 Mammalian brains, drawn to the same scale (diagram) 1
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 The general cyctoarchitecture of the human cortex is indistinguishable from that of other primates and most other mammals. 5
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 No differences have been discovered between humans and nonhuman mammals    with respect to short-term or long-term plasticity of cortical neurons,    and the action of neuromodulators. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 Only two things have been discovered that could distinguish the human cortex from that of other primates:    (1) differences in growth rate and length of period of growth    and (2) the presence of the Broca's area. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 The human brain    continues to mature    until the age of 20. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 A critical phase    in the development of the human brain    seems to occur around the age of 2.5 years. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 The frontal lobe contains the Broca's area which is responsible for the temporal aspects of language,     including syntax,    while the temporal lobe contains the Wernicke's speech center,  which is responsible for the meaning of words and sentences. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 93 The posterior part (BA 44) of the Broca's area in humans    and the ventral premotor area of nonhuman primates    are probably homologous. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 94 If anything concerning language in the human brain    developed relatively recently or underwent substantial modifications,    it was probably Broca's area    rather than Wernicke's area. 1
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 94 The most clear-cut differences between humans and nonhuman primates    concern the syntactical complexity of language. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 94 During hominid evolution, the frontal-prefrontal cortex appears to have been reorganized in such a way that the facial and oral motor cortex and the related subcortical speech centers came under the control of a kind of cortex    specialized in all aspects    of temporal sequence of events,    including the sequence of action. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 95 Self-recognition (as evidenced by the mirror test) apparently requires a large associative cortex, including prefrontal cortex. 1
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 95 The evolution of the syntactical language    may have strongly favored    the highest states of consciousness,    such as self-reflection,    thinking,    and action planning. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 95 While thinking is not necessarily bound to language,    most people think verbally. 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 95 Many concepts typical of the human brain    "exist" only linguistically,    because we can talk about them (e.g. future events or abstract entities such as society and freedom). 0
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness 95 It may well be that the evolution of a special type of prefrontal cortex,    that dealing with the an analysis of the temporal sequence of events,    was at the basis of increased capability    for action planning,    syntactical language,    imitation,    and understanding the behavior of others. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 111 A Neurobiology for Consciousness 16
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Some aspects of the processes of consciousness can be related to the operation of specific brain regions and systems. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 For the problem of self,    the brain regions and systems are located in a restricted set of neural territories. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Consciousness can be separated from    wakefulness and low level attention,    as shown by patients who can be awake and attentive    without having normal consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Consciousness and emotion    are not separable. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 The contiguity of neural systems that support consciousness and emotion    may indicate an ever closer anatomical and functional connection. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Consciousness can be separated into simple and complex kinds. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Core consciousness provides the organism with a sense of self about the here and now. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Core consciousness does not pertain to the future or the past -- the only past briefly illuminated in core consciousness is what occurred in the immediately preceding instant. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Extended consciousness has many levels and grades. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Extended consciousness provides the organism with an identity and a person, an elaborate sense of self, and places that self at a specific point in individual historical time. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Extended consciousness offers awareness of the lived past and the anticipated future,    along with objects in the here and now. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 112 Core consciousness is a simple biological phenomenon,    having one level of organization;    it is stable across the lifetime of an organism. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Core consciousness is not dependent on conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or language. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Damasio believes that core consciousness is not exclusively human. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Extended consciousness is a complex biological phenomenon, having several levels of organization, and it evolves across the lifetime of the organism. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Extended consciousness depends on conventional memory and working memory, and when it reaches its peak, it depends on language as well. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Simple levels of extended consciousness are present in some nonhumans. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Extended consciousness attains its maximum development only in humans. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Extended consciousness allows a whole being to be known, and both the past and the anticipated future are sensed along with the here and now. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Neurological observations reveal that when extended consciousness is impaired, core consciousness remains unscathed. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Impairments that begin at the level of core consciousness demolish the entire edifice of consciousness, and extended consciousness collapses as well. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Extended consciousness is not an independent variety of consciousness; it is built on the foundation of core consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Core consciousness and extended consciousness are associated with two kinds of self. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 A sense of self that emerges in core consciousness is the core self,    a transient and repeatedly re-created entity    for each and every object    with which the brain interacts. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 The traditional notion of self, which we link to the idea of identity, is the autobiographical self,    and corresponds to a non-transient collection    of unique facts and ways of being    that characterize a person. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Study of neurological patients suggests that functions such as language, memory, reason, attention, and working memory appear necessary only for the higher reaches of extended consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Memory, intelligent inferences, and language are critical to the generation of the autobiographical self and the process of extended consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Consciousness is unlikely to begin at a high level in the hierarchy of cognitive processes. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 The earliest forms of consciousness    precedes inferences and interpretations. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 A theory of consciousness should not be just a theory of how the brain attends to the image of an object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Natural low-level attention    precedes consciousness,    and focused attention    follows the unfolding of consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 Attention is not sufficient for consciousness,    and is not the same as consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 113 A theory of consciousness should not be just a theory of how they brain creates unified mental scenes, an operation that requires the cooperation of numerous and neural/cognitive functions, and in particular, the participation of working memory. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 A comprehensive theory of consciousness might well begin by focusing on the problem of self. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 The creation of a first-person perspective, of subjectivity, is that puzzle on which consciousness hinges. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 Addressing the problem of self also addresses the qualia issue relative to the images of the organism having consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 Understanding consciousness calls for seeing it in terms of two key players, the organism and the object, and in terms of the relationship of those players in the course of their natural interactions. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 Consciousness arises    when an organism is involved in relating    to some object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 The object in the consciousness relation is causing the organism to change. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 Consciousness requires brains that can assemble neural patterns about objects external to it, and the ability to turn neural patterns into images and, eventually, to assemble neural patterns and images about its own neural patterns and images. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 They neural patterns and images    necessary for consciousness    are those which constitute proxies for the organism,    for the object,   and for the relationship between the two. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 The biology of consciousness is a matter of discovering how the brain can construct neural patterns    that map both the organism and the object and their relationships. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 For an external object, the brain constructs maps by mapping the sensory and motor interactions    that take place between the object and the body. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 The object can exist in two varieties:   (1) actually present and interacting with the organism now,    or present as an (2) activated memory recalled from past occasions on which the object has interacted with the organism. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 114 Studies of perception, learning and memory, and language have given an idea of how the brain processes an object, in sensory and motor terms, and how knowledge about an object can be stored, categorized, and retrieved. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 For the organism,    the brain holds a naturally constructed set of maps,    which stand for the whole organism. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 The organism "model" inside the brain of the organism is a likely biological forerunner for what eventually becomes the sense of self. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 This sense of self, including the elaborate self that encompasses identity and personhood,    can be found in the ensemble of brain devices that continuously maintain the body state within a narrow range and relative stability required for survival (the process known as homeostasis). 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 The ensemble of homeostasis devices is the basis for the proto-self,    the non-conscious foundation for the levels of self that appear in our minds as the conscious, protagonists of consciousness:    core self and autobiographical self. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 The proto-self, the core self and autobiographical self are important references in constructing consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 The list of neural devices to support the proto-self begins with the nuclei located at the brainstem level. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 Proto-self neural devices also include those at higher levels: the hypothalamus, basal forebrain, and somatosensory cortices such is the insula and S2. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 115 All of the proto-self structures are involved in regulating the life state, all representing the life state. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 Functions such as proto-self, core self, and autobiographical self are not located in one particular brain region, or in one set of regions, but are the product of the interaction of neural and chemical signals among a set of regions. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 There are no single "centers" responsible for the sort of complex functions that are part of mind processes. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 Damasio proposes three steps in the assembling of consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 Step 1 -- processes within the brain when an organism    interacts with an object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 Step 2 -- the gradual build up of memories    of many instances of a special class of objects:    the objects of the organism's own past experience,    reactivated in recall    and illuminated by core consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 Step 3 --  simultaneously holding active,    for a substantial amount of time,    the many images whose collection defines the autobiographical self    and the images that define the object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 The reiterated components of the autobiographical self and the object    are affected by the feeling of self-knowing    that arises in core consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 When an organism    interacts with an object,    the brain uses its sensory systems    to make neural maps of the object.    These are first-order maps. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 The brain also makes first-order maps    for the movements it must carry out    to apprehend the object,    such as eye or hand movements. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 116 The organism's object reaction maps    are constructed in the regions of the brain supporting the protoself,    and they map the organism    in the process of being changed    as a consequence of interacting with the object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 All the first-order maps --    those of the object    and those of the organism reacting to the object --    are the source of mental images    whose flow constitutes the thought process. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Consciousness occurs    when signals coming from first-order maps    form second-order mapping. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 The second order maps describe the relationship between the object and the organism. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 The organism is represented by an integrated pattern of the non-conscious protoself. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Second-order maps are the source of mental images,    as is the case with first-order maps,    and they also contribute those images    to the thought process. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Consciousness is constituted by the images that these second-order maps contribute to the mind, in the form of a sense of self knowing. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 The presence of an object    causes the organism to respond to it    and to form first-order sensory maps for the object    and for the changes the organism undergoes    during the object processing. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Second-order sensory maps are formed    that "represent" events that are occurring    in the first-order sensory maps. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Second-order maps    signify without words    the organism's relationship with the object,    and specifically the fact, that an object has caused the organism to change. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Second-order maps    signify to an organism    that interacting with a given object    or thinking a given thought    modifies that organism. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Second-order maps    signal the modifications that the protoself undergoes    and are caused by the interaction of the organism with the object. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Because both the protoself and the second-order maps are constructed with a vocabulary of body signals,    the images that result from such second order mapping take the form of feelings. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 117 Candidate neural sites for second-order maps    include the superior colliculus,    the thalamus,    the cingulate cortices,    some medial parietal association cortices,    and the prefrontal cortices. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 Not all neural sites    are equally likely contributors to second-order maps.    The cingulate cortices and thalamus are far more likely sites than the others. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 Neural sites are richly interconnected,    sometimes directly, sometimes via relays in the thalamus,    and the second order neural pattern occurs as a result of the interactions among the several neural sites. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 Consciousness depends most critically    on evolutionarily old regions. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 The structures without which consciousness cannot operate    are all largely located in the depths of the brain and near its midline    rather than on its surface. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 Consciousness does not depend primarily on the modern brain achievements of the neocortex,    those in which fine perception,    language,    and high reason    most directly depend. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 All but one of the anatomical structures that Damasio hypothesizes as supportive of the protoself and of the second order mappings of core consciousness    are evolutionarily older and anatomically deep,    central,    and paramidline.    The insula and S2 cortices, the one partial exception,    are not part of the external neocortical surface. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 118 All of these structures related to core consciousness are primarily involved in the representation and regulation of the organism state. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 Albeit even the simplest forms of core consciousness involve varied neocortical regions,    the structures indispensable for the operations of consciousness    are not located in neocortex. 1
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 The neocortical regions (i.e. the evolutionarily modern early sensory structures)    are also involved    in the process of making consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 Disabling one of the early sensory regions,    even if extensive,    does not compromise the central resource of consciousness    but only a sector of it. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 The regions that support the protoself and second-order structures    constitute a central resource,    and their dysfunction causes a disruption of the process of consciousness. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 Most of the structures of the protoself and second order mappings are involved in most of the following functions:    (1) regulating organism homeostasis, signaling body structures, and signaling body states, including those related to pain, pleasure, drives, and motivations;    (2) participating in the processes of emotion and feeling;    (3) participating in the processes of attention;    (4) participating in the processes of wakefulness and sleep;    (5) participating in the learning process. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 Some brainstem structures are involved in the processes of wakefulness and attention,    and they modulate the activity    of the cerebral cortex    via the intralamina thalamic nuclei,    the nonthalamic cortical projections of monomines,    and the thalamic projections of acetylcholine nuclei. 0
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness 119 This current formulation for the neurobiology of consciousness is not in conflict with those that concern the brainstem's ascending reticulata activating system and its extension in the thalamus. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 Space in the Brain -- Different Neural Substrates for Allocentric and Egocentric Frames of Reference 70
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 There is considerable debate as to how and where    spatial information is coded in visual system. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 The visuospatial processing that underlies our conscious perceptions of objects and their spatial relations    is quite separate    from the visuospatial processing that controls our actions    directed at those objects. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 Beyond primary visual cortex (V1),    visual information is conveyed to a complex array    of higher order visual areas    in the cerebral cortex. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 In 1982, researchers were able to identify two broad streams of projections arising from V1 in the monkey:   (1) a ventral stream projecting eventually to the inferotemporal cortex    and a (2) dorsal stream projecting to the posterior parietal cortex. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 The dorsal and ventral streams also receive inputs from a number of other subcortical visual structures, such is the superior colliculus,    which send prominent projections to the dorsal stream (via connections to the thalamus). 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 The ventral stream plays a critical role in the identification and recognition of objects. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 189 It has been known for a long time that patients with damage to the area of the dorsal stream have difficulty reaching in the correct direction for objects. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 190 Patients with damage to the dorsal stream are able to describe the orientation, size, shape, and even the relative spatial location    of the very objects they are unable to grasp correctly. 1
Goodale; Space in the Brain 190 Patients with brain damage to the ventral rather than the dorsal stream structures have great difficulty recognizing common objects on the basis of their visual appearance, but have no problem grasping objects placed in front of them or moving through the world without bumping into things. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 190 A young woman who suffered damage to her ventral stream pathways from anoxia that was the result of carbon monoxide poisoning. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 191 The role of the dorsal stream in visuomotor control is now well-established. 1
Goodale; Space in the Brain 191 The processing of the spatial relations of objects    is as central to perception    as the processing of the intrinsic features of the objects,    such as the shape and surface properties. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 192 In contrast to the conscious perception of spatial layout provided by the ventral stream,    the computation of spatial location carried out by the dorsal stream is entirely related to the guidance of specific visuomotor actions,    such as grasping an object,    walking around obstacles,    or gazing at different objects in a scene. 1
Goodale; Space in the Brain 192 The dorsal stream mechanisms do not compute the "allocentric" location of the target object, but rather the "egocentric" coordinates of the location of the object with respect to the location of the observer. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 192 Electrophysiological studies of spatial coding in the dorsal stream indicates that egocentric frames of reference predominate. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 192 There is no clear evidence that allocentric spatial coding -- insofar as this refers to the position of an object with respect to other objects -- exists in the posterior parietal cortex. 0
Goodale; Space in the Brain 199 Whatever the mechanisms might be that mediate our conscious perception of the spatial relations among objects in a visual scene,    it is clear that they do not reside in the dorsal stream,    which is primarily concerned with transforming visual information into actions using egocentric frames of reference. 7
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Binocular Rivalry in Human Visual Awareness 32
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Binocular rivalry is an unstable viewing condition that dissociates    subjective perception    from sensory input. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Free search results for late conscious visual experience during arrival rate to covariation of activity and multiple cortical areas and both ventral and dorsal visual pathways, and in prefrontal cortex. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Conscious vision    reflects the interactions    between widely distributed cortical centers,    including regions lying outside the visual cortex,    rather than the activity in specific visual areas or pathways. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Interactions    in visual pathways    contribute to phenomenal awareness    by integrating distributed neural processes    involved in object representation,    in attentional selection,    and in temporal integration. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Bistable percepts in which a single pattern of retinal input    gives rise to two alternate perceptual interpretations    provides a basis to differentiate brain activity    specific to consciousness    from unconscious neuronal responses    to visual stimuli. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 For bistable percepts,    changes in perception    occur in the absence of any change    in the stimulus itself. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Necker cubes and ambiguous figures    are classical examples of bistable perception. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Perceptual instability also arises when dissimilar images are presented to the two eyes. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 For binocular rivalry,     perception alternates spontaneously    every few seconds    between each monocular view. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Virtually any pair    of dissimilar images    can be made to rival. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Since virtually any pair of dissimilar images can be made to rival    when presented dichoptically,    binocular rivalry provides a powerful paradigm to study the neural correlates of perceptual organization and visual awareness. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Firing of most neurons in primary visual cortex (V1) reflects the visual input and not the percept during rivalry. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Activity at higher levels in the ventral pathway    show increasing correlation with the perceptual state. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Binocular rivalry appears to involve interactions between binocular neurons    at several stages    in the ventral visual pathway. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 231 Neural processing in the ventral pathway    culminates in the inferior temporal (IT) cortex,    where most neurons modulate their firing    in concert with perception. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 232 At the inferior temporal (IT) stage of processing,    activity reflects the brain's internal view    of the visual scene    rather than the retinal stimulus. 1
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 232 Binocular rivalry reflects central selective processes    that take effect subsequent to the analysis    of both monocular stimuli. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 232 Is activity in the ventral pathway sufficient for the conscious perception of a visual stimulus, or does visual awareness require processing in other brain regions, particularly the parietal and frontal lobes? 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 233 Multiple prefrontal areas reflect the perceptual state. 1
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 233 Three distinct prefrontal areas in both hemispheres were identified that showed increased activity during perceptual dominance of the face stimulus: (1) posterior middle and inferior frontal gyri (Brodmann Area BA 44), (2) inferior frontal gyrus and insular (BA 45/47), and (3) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46). 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 233 Psychophysical observations suggest that perceptual alternations during rivalry    result from the same neural operations    underlying other multistable perceptual phenomena,    such as ambiguous figures. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 233 Perceptual transitions during rivalry    reflect an endogenous neural instability    in the absence of any change in the retinal image. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 235 Research results suggest that a distributed right occipito-parietal and frontal network    mediates the perceptual switches experienced during rivalry. 2
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 235 Visuospatial neglect syndromes    occur most frequently    following lesions to the inferior parietal and frontal cortex. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 235 The dorsal visual pathway has traditionally been associated with spatial processing. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 235 Research results indicate that conscious experience during rivalry    depends on processing in multiple extrastriate ventral,    parietal,    and prefrontal cortical areas. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 237 The primate visual system is conventionally divided into two processing pathways    originating in the primary visual cortex. 2
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 237 One visual pathway extends dorsally    in the occipito-parietal lobe;    the other pathway extends ventrally    in the occipito-temporal lobe. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 238 The dorsal pathway appears to be specialized for processing spatial attributes of the visuals seen responsible for the coordinate transformations necessary to support visually guided behavior. 1
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 238 The ventral visual pathway is involved in object representation and recognition. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 238 Research studies have emphasized the key role played by the ventral pathway and conscious visual perception. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 238 Shape-selective responses in the temporal lobe reflect subjective perception of visual objects and are modulated by attention. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry 238 Lesions in the temporal lobe lead to profound impairment in visual recognition and awareness. 0
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry