Metzinger;
Neural Correlates of Consciousness |
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Book |
Page |
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Topic |
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Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
17 |
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What Is a Neural Correlate of
Consciousness? |
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Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
18 |
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Background state of
consciousness |
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1 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
19 |
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Contents of consciousness |
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1 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
24 |
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Necessity and Sufficiency |
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5 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
24 |
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Mimimal sufficiency |
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0 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
26 |
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Ordinary functioning brain and
ordinary environments |
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2 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
27 |
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Normal brain, unusual inputs |
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1 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
27 |
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Normal brain, varying brain
stimulation |
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0 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
28 |
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Abnormal functioning due to
lesions |
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1 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
32 |
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An NCC should be understood as a
minimal neural system that correlates with consciousness. |
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4 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
32 |
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We should constrain the search
for the NCC by aiming to find a neural correlate that is as small as
possible. |
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0 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
32 |
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Given a broad system that
appears to correlate with consciousness, we need to isolate the core relevant
parts and aspects of that system that underlie the correlation. |
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0 |
Chalmers;
What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness |
33 |
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Distinguish NCCs for background
state and for content. |
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1 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The amygdala is a complex of many different
nuclei and is reciprocally connected with the associative cortex, particularly with the orbitofrontal
prefrontal cortex (either directly or via the medial dorsal thalamic nucleus) and
the hippocampal formation. |
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48 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The amygdala strongly
influences the sensory (visual, auditory, gustatory) cortex. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The amygdala receives subcortical
input from the olfactory
system,
the limbic thalamic
nuclei,
and the rest of the limbic system. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The amygdala is in control of autonomic responses (via the hypothalamus). |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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For cognitive and emotional functions, the amygdala is an important center (together with the anterior cingulate cortex) for evaluating and perhaps storing a negative experience, such as in the
context of fear conditioning and anxiety. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The hippocampal
formation and the surrounding parahippocampal,
perrirhinal, and entorhinal cortex are import centers
for the formation and
consolidation of traces of the declarative memory in the cortex. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The basal
ganglia
are involved in the subconscious planning and final decisions to take voluntary action under the influence of the limbic system. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The basal
forebrain-septal nuclei complex is connected
reciprocally
with the hippocampus and the amygdala, as well as with
centers of the reticular formation. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The basal forebrain is believed
to be involved in the control of attention and of activity of a neocortical
neuronal network. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The mesolimbic system (nucleus accumbens, lateral
hypothalamus,
ventral tegmental area) is characterized by the neuromodulator dopamine. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The mesolimbic
system has strong connections with the orbital frontal cortex and is involved in the formation of positive memories and pleasure, and perhaps in the control of attention in the context of new events. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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All parts of the brain outside the cortex contribute
substantially to consciousness while their activities remain completely unconscious. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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Although activity
in the cortex is necessary
for consciousness, we are unaware
of processes going on in the primary and secondary sensory and motor areas of the cortex. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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We are aware only of processes bound to the
activity of the cingulate and the associative cortex, and even then of only some of those processes. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The cingulate
cortex (Brodmann areas 23 and 24) is that part of the cortex which surrounded
subcortical parts of the telencephalon and the thalamus. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The cingulate
cortex is tightly connected to the prefrontal and parahippocampal cortex, basal forebrain-septal region, the amygdala, the limbic thalamic nuclei, and the reticular
formation. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The anterior
part of the cingulate cortex is involved in the sensation of pain and in memory of painful events. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The cingulate
cortex may be the conscious
counterpart of the amygdala. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
81 |
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The cingulate
cortex is always
active for tasks
requiring attention. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The association
cortex is the portion of the cortex that contains
no primary sensory or motor cortical areas, but is involved in the "higher" processing of information coming from these areas. |
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2 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The left
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is involved in symbolic-analytic information processing, mathematics, language, and interpreting drawings and symbols. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The right PPC deals with real and mental spatial
orientation,
the control of hand and eye movement, change of perspective, and control
of attention. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The associative
superior and middle temporal cortex houses perception of complex auditory stimuli, including Wernicke's
semantics speech center, which is crucial for the understanding and production of meaningful written and spoken language. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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Perception of music usually involves the right medial
temporal cortex. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The inferior
temporal cortex (ITC) is decisive for complex visual information regarding non-spatial properties of objects and scenes, along with their meaning and correct interpretation. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The prefrontal
cortex (PFC)
includes the largest portion of the cortex (about 30% in man) and has been viewed
by many neuroscientists at the highest brain
center
and the seat of consciousness, personality, intelligence. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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Usually, two
major parts of the prefrontal
cortex are distinguished in primates: a dorsolateral portion and a ventral-orbitofrontal portion. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The dorsolateral
PFC appears to be
involved in (1) attention and selective control of sensory experience; (2) action planning and decision-making; (3) temporal
coding of events; (4) judgment and insight, particularly with
respect to reality; (5) spontaneity of behavior; (6) strategic
thinking;
(7) associative thinking; (8) working memory. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The dorsolateral
PFC is predominantly,
though not exclusively, oriented toward the external
world and its demands, including short-term memory. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The orbitofrontal
PFC is
involved in social
and emotional aspects of behavior, ethical
considerations, divergent
thinking, risk assessment, awareness of consequences of behavior, emotional life, and emotional control of behavior. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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Damage to
the orbitofrontal PFC results
in loss of interest in important life events, and loss of "ego," in "immoral"
behavior,
and in disregard of negative consequences of one's own behavior. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The orbitofrontal
PFC is predominantly oriented toward the internal emotional and social aspects of life. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The supplementary
motor area (SMA) is situated between the medial aspect of the motor cortex and the dorsomedial frontal cortex, and represents something like an associative motor cortex. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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The supplementary motor area (SMA) is
active during the preparation and planning of complex
movements
and during imagined movements. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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Together with the prefrontal cortex, the SMA contributes to the awareness of being the author of one's own deeds. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
83 |
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Different parts of the association cortex contribute in
different ways to the great diversity and content of consciousness, including awareness of external and internal sensory
events; consequences of one's own behavior; autographic,
body, and ego identity; action planning; and authorship of one's own deeds. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
87 |
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All tetrapod vertebrates have brains that are very similar in the general organization and even in many details. |
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4 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
87 |
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Body size
appears to be the single most important factor influencing brain size. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
88 |
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Mammalian brains, drawn to the same scale (diagram) |
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1 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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The general cyctoarchitecture of the human cortex is indistinguishable from that of other primates and most other mammals. |
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5 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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No differences have been discovered between humans and nonhuman mammals with respect to short-term or long-term plasticity of cortical neurons, and the action of neuromodulators. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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Only two
things have been discovered that could distinguish the human cortex from that of other primates: (1) differences in growth rate and length of period of growth
and
(2) the presence of the Broca's area. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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The human brain continues to
mature until the age of 20. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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A critical
phase in
the development of
the human brain seems to occur around the age of 2.5 years. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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The frontal
lobe contains the Broca's
area which is responsible for the temporal aspects of language, including syntax, while the temporal
lobe contains the Wernicke's
speech center, which is responsible
for the meaning of words and sentences. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
93 |
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The posterior
part (BA 44) of the Broca's
area in humans and the ventral premotor area of nonhuman primates are probably homologous. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
94 |
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If anything concerning language in the human brain developed
relatively recently or underwent substantial modifications, it was probably Broca's area rather than Wernicke's
area. |
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1 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
94 |
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The most clear-cut
differences between humans and nonhuman primates concern the syntactical complexity of language. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
94 |
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During hominid
evolution, the frontal-prefrontal
cortex appears to have been reorganized in such a way that the
facial and oral motor cortex and the related subcortical speech centers came
under the control of a kind of cortex specialized in all
aspects of temporal sequence of events, including the sequence
of action. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
95 |
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Self-recognition (as evidenced by the mirror test) apparently requires a
large associative
cortex, including prefrontal
cortex. |
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1 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
95 |
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The evolution of the syntactical language may have strongly favored the highest states of consciousness, such as self-reflection, thinking, and action planning. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
95 |
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While thinking is not
necessarily bound to language, most people think verbally. |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
95 |
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Many concepts typical of the human brain "exist"
only linguistically, because we can talk
about them (e.g. future
events or abstract entities such as society and freedom). |
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0 |
Roth; Evolution and Ontogeny of Consciousness |
95 |
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It may well be that the evolution of a special type of prefrontal cortex, that dealing with
the an analysis of the
temporal sequence of
events,
was at the basis of increased capability for action
planning, syntactical language, imitation, and understanding the behavior of others. |
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0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
111 |
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A Neurobiology for Consciousness |
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16 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
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Some aspects
of the processes of consciousness can be related to the operation of specific
brain regions and systems. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
For the problem of self, the brain
regions and systems are located in a restricted set of neural territories. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Consciousness
can be separated from wakefulness and low level attention, as shown by patients who can be awake and attentive without
having normal consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Consciousness
and emotion are not
separable. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
The contiguity of neural systems that support consciousness and emotion may indicate an ever closer anatomical and functional connection. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Consciousness
can be separated into
simple and complex kinds. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Core consciousness provides the organism with a sense
of self about the here
and now. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Core consciousness does not pertain to the future or the past -- the only past briefly illuminated in core consciousness is what
occurred in the immediately preceding instant. |
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0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Extended consciousness has many levels and grades. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Extended consciousness provides the organism with an identity and a person, an elaborate sense of self, and places that self at a specific point in individual historical time. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Extended consciousness offers awareness of the lived past and the anticipated future, along with objects in the here and now. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
112 |
|
Core consciousness is a simple
biological phenomenon, having one
level of organization; it is stable across the lifetime of an organism. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Core consciousness is not
dependent on conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or language. |
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1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Damasio believes that core consciousness is not
exclusively human. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Extended consciousness is a complex biological
phenomenon, having several
levels of organization, and it evolves across the lifetime of the organism. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Extended consciousness depends
on conventional memory and working memory, and when it reaches its peak, it
depends on language as well. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Simple
levels of extended consciousness are present in some nonhumans. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Extended consciousness attains its maximum development only in humans. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Extended consciousness allows a
whole being to be known, and both the past and the anticipated future are
sensed along with the here and now. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Neurological observations reveal
that when extended consciousness is impaired, core consciousness remains
unscathed. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Impairments that begin at the
level of core consciousness demolish the entire edifice of consciousness, and
extended consciousness collapses as well. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Extended consciousness is not an
independent variety of consciousness; it is built on the foundation of core
consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Core consciousness and extended consciousness are associated with two kinds of
self. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
A sense of self that emerges in core consciousness is the core self, a transient and repeatedly re-created entity
for
each and every object with which the brain
interacts. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
The traditional
notion of self, which
we link to the idea of identity, is the autobiographical self, and corresponds to
a non-transient collection of unique facts and ways of being that characterize a person. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Study of neurological patients
suggests that functions such as language, memory, reason, attention, and
working memory appear necessary only for the higher reaches of extended
consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Memory, intelligent inferences,
and language are critical to the generation of the autobiographical self and
the process of extended consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Consciousness
is unlikely to begin
at a high level in the hierarchy of cognitive processes. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
The earliest
forms of consciousness precedes inferences and interpretations. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
A theory of
consciousness should not be just a theory of how
the brain attends to
the image of an object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Natural low-level
attention precedes consciousness, and focused attention follows the unfolding of consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
Attention
is not sufficient for
consciousness, and is not
the same as consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
113 |
|
A theory of consciousness should
not be just a theory of how they brain creates unified mental scenes, an
operation that requires the cooperation of numerous and neural/cognitive
functions, and in particular, the participation of working memory. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
A comprehensive
theory of consciousness might well begin by focusing on the problem of self. |
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1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
The creation of a first-person
perspective, of subjectivity, is that puzzle on which consciousness hinges. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
Addressing the problem of self
also addresses the qualia issue relative to the images of the organism having
consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
Understanding consciousness
calls for seeing it in terms of two key players, the organism and the object,
and in terms of the relationship of those players in the course of their
natural interactions. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
Consciousness
arises
when an organism
is involved in relating to some object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
The object in the consciousness relation is causing the organism to change. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
Consciousness requires brains
that can assemble neural patterns about objects external to it, and the
ability to turn neural patterns into images and, eventually, to assemble
neural patterns and images about its own neural patterns and images. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
They neural
patterns and images necessary for consciousness are those which constitute proxies for the organism, for the object, and for the relationship between the two. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
The biology
of consciousness is a
matter of discovering how the brain can construct neural patterns that map both the organism and the object and their relationships. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
For an external
object, the brain
constructs maps by mapping the sensory and motor interactions that take place between the object
and the body. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
The object can exist in two varieties: (1) actually
present and interacting
with the organism now, or present as an (2) activated memory recalled from past occasions on which the object has interacted with the organism. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
114 |
|
Studies of perception, learning
and memory, and language have given an idea of how the brain processes an
object, in sensory and motor terms, and how knowledge about an object can be
stored, categorized, and retrieved. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
For the
organism,
the brain holds
a naturally constructed set of maps, which stand for the
whole organism. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
The organism
"model" inside the brain of the organism is a likely biological forerunner for what eventually becomes the sense of self. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
This sense
of self, including the elaborate
self that encompasses identity and personhood, can be found in the
ensemble of brain devices that continuously maintain the body state within a narrow range and relative stability required for survival (the process known as homeostasis). |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
The ensemble of homeostasis devices is the basis for the proto-self, the non-conscious
foundation for the
levels of self that appear in our minds as the
conscious, protagonists of consciousness: core self and autobiographical self. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
The proto-self, the core self
and autobiographical self are important references in constructing
consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
The list of neural devices to
support the proto-self begins with the nuclei located at the brainstem level. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
Proto-self neural devices also
include those at higher levels: the hypothalamus, basal forebrain, and
somatosensory cortices such is the insula and S2. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
115 |
|
All of the proto-self structures
are involved in regulating the life state, all representing the life state. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
Functions such as proto-self,
core self, and autobiographical self are not located in one particular brain
region, or in one set of regions, but are the product of the interaction of
neural and chemical signals among a set of regions. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
There are no
single "centers" responsible for the sort of complex
functions that are part of mind processes. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
Damasio
proposes three steps
in the assembling of consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
Step 1 -- processes
within the brain when an organism interacts with an object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
Step 2 -- the gradual build up of memories of many instances of a special class of objects: the objects of the organism's own past experience, reactivated in recall and illuminated by core consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
Step 3 -- simultaneously holding active, for a substantial
amount of time, the many
images whose collection defines the autobiographical self
and the images that define the object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
The reiterated
components of the autobiographical
self and the object are affected
by the feeling of self-knowing that arises in core consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
When an organism interacts with an object, the brain uses its sensory systems to make neural maps of the object. These are first-order maps. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
The brain also makes first-order maps for the movements it must carry out to apprehend the object, such as eye or hand movements. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
116 |
|
The organism's
object reaction maps are constructed in the regions of the brain supporting
the protoself, and they map
the organism in the process
of being changed as a consequence of interacting with the object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
All the first-order maps -- those of the object and those of the organism reacting to the object -- are the source of
mental images whose flow
constitutes the thought
process. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Consciousness
occurs when signals
coming from first-order
maps form second-order
mapping. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
The second
order maps describe the relationship between the object and the organism. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
The organism is represented by an integrated pattern of the non-conscious protoself. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Second-order maps are the source of mental images, as is the case with first-order maps, and they also contribute
those images to the thought
process. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Consciousness
is constituted by the images that these second-order maps contribute to the mind, in the form of a sense of self
knowing. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
The presence of an object causes the organism to respond to it and to form first-order sensory maps for the object and for the changes the organism
undergoes
during the object
processing. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Second-order sensory maps are formed that "represent" events that are occurring in the first-order
sensory maps. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Second-order maps signify without
words the organism's relationship with the object, and specifically the fact, that an object has caused the organism to change. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Second-order maps signify to an organism that interacting with a given object or thinking a given thought modifies that organism. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Second-order maps signal the modifications that the protoself undergoes and are caused by
the interaction of
the organism with the
object. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Because both the protoself and the second-order maps are constructed with a vocabulary of body signals, the images that result from such second order mapping take the form
of feelings. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
117 |
|
Candidate
neural sites for second-order
maps include the superior colliculus, the thalamus, the cingulate cortices, some medial
parietal association cortices, and the prefrontal
cortices. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
Not all neural
sites are equally
likely contributors to
second-order maps. The cingulate
cortices and thalamus are far more likely sites than the
others. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
Neural sites are
richly interconnected, sometimes directly, sometimes via relays in the thalamus, and the second
order neural pattern occurs as a result of the interactions among the several neural sites. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
Consciousness
depends most critically on evolutionarily old regions. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
The structures without which consciousness cannot operate are all largely
located in the depths of the brain and near its midline rather than on its surface. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
Consciousness
does not depend primarily on the modern brain achievements of the neocortex, those in which fine perception,
language, and high
reason most
directly depend. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
All but one
of the anatomical structures that Damasio hypothesizes as supportive of the protoself and of the second order mappings of core consciousness are evolutionarily older and anatomically deep,
central, and paramidline. The insula and S2 cortices, the one partial exception, are not part of the external neocortical
surface. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
118 |
|
All of these structures related to core consciousness are primarily involved in the representation and regulation of the organism state. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
Albeit even the simplest forms of core consciousness involve varied neocortical regions, the structures indispensable for the operations of consciousness are not located in neocortex. |
|
1 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
The neocortical regions (i.e. the evolutionarily modern early
sensory structures) are also
involved in the process
of making consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
Disabling
one of the early sensory regions, even if extensive, does not
compromise the central
resource of consciousness but only a
sector of it. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
The regions
that support the protoself and second-order structures constitute a central resource, and their dysfunction causes a disruption of the process of consciousness. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
Most of the structures of the protoself and second order mappings are involved in most of the
following functions: (1) regulating
organism homeostasis, signaling body structures, and signaling body states,
including those related to pain, pleasure,
drives, and
motivations;
(2) participating in the processes of emotion and feeling; (3) participating
in the processes of attention; (4) participating
in the processes of wakefulness and sleep; (5) participating
in the learning
process. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
Some brainstem
structures are involved in the processes of wakefulness and attention, and they modulate
the activity
of the cerebral
cortex
via the intralamina
thalamic nuclei, the nonthalamic
cortical projections of monomines, and the thalamic
projections of acetylcholine
nuclei. |
|
0 |
Damasio; Neurobiology for Consciousness |
119 |
|
This current
formulation for the neurobiology
of consciousness is not in conflict with those that
concern the brainstem's ascending reticulata activating system and
its extension in the thalamus. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
Space in the Brain -- Different
Neural Substrates for Allocentric and Egocentric Frames of Reference |
|
70 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
There is considerable
debate as to how and where spatial
information is coded in visual system. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
The visuospatial
processing that underlies our conscious perceptions of objects and their spatial relations is quite separate from the visuospatial processing that controls our actions directed at those objects. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
Beyond primary visual cortex (V1), visual
information is conveyed to a complex array of higher
order visual areas in the cerebral
cortex. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
In 1982, researchers were able to identify two
broad streams of projections arising from V1 in the
monkey: (1) a ventral stream projecting
eventually to the inferotemporal cortex and a (2) dorsal stream projecting to the posterior parietal cortex. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
The dorsal and ventral streams also receive inputs from a number of other subcortical visual structures, such is the superior colliculus, which send prominent projections to the dorsal stream (via connections to
the thalamus). |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
The ventral
stream plays a critical role in the identification and recognition of
objects. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
189 |
|
It has been known for a long
time that patients with damage to the area of the dorsal stream have difficulty reaching in the correct direction for
objects. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
190 |
|
Patients
with damage to the dorsal stream are able to describe the orientation, size, shape, and even the relative spatial location of the very objects they are unable to grasp correctly. |
|
1 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
190 |
|
Patients with brain damage to
the ventral rather than the dorsal stream structures have great difficulty
recognizing common objects on the basis of their visual appearance, but have
no problem grasping objects placed in front of them or moving through the
world without bumping into things. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
190 |
|
A young
woman who suffered
damage to her ventral stream pathways from anoxia that was the result of carbon
monoxide poisoning. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
191 |
|
The role of the dorsal stream in visuomotor control is now well-established. |
|
1 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
191 |
|
The processing of the spatial relations of objects is as central to perception as the processing of
the intrinsic
features of the objects, such as the shape and surface properties. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
192 |
|
In contrast to the conscious perception of spatial layout provided by the ventral stream, the computation of spatial location carried out by
the dorsal stream is
entirely related to the guidance of specific visuomotor actions, such as grasping an object, walking around obstacles, or gazing at different objects in a scene. |
|
1 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
192 |
|
The dorsal
stream mechanisms do
not compute the "allocentric" location of the target object, but rather the "egocentric"
coordinates of the location
of the object with respect to the location of the observer. |
|
0 |
Goodale; Space in the Brain |
192 |
|
Electrophysiological studies of spatial
coding in the dorsal
stream indicates that egocentric frames of reference predominate. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
192 |
|
There is no
clear evidence that allocentric
spatial coding -- insofar as this refers to the position of an object with respect to other objects -- exists in the posterior parietal cortex. |
|
0 |
Goodale;
Space in the Brain |
199 |
|
Whatever the mechanisms might be
that mediate our conscious perception of the spatial relations among objects in a visual
scene,
it is clear that they do not reside in the dorsal stream, which is primarily
concerned with transforming visual information into actions using egocentric frames of reference. |
|
7 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Binocular Rivalry in Human
Visual Awareness |
|
32 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Binocular rivalry is an unstable viewing condition that dissociates subjective
perception
from sensory
input. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Free search results for late
conscious visual experience during arrival rate to covariation of activity
and multiple cortical areas and both ventral and dorsal visual pathways, and
in prefrontal cortex. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Conscious vision reflects the interactions between widely
distributed cortical centers, including regions lying outside the visual cortex, rather than the activity in specific visual areas or pathways. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Interactions in visual
pathways
contribute to phenomenal awareness by integrating distributed neural processes involved in object
representation,
in attentional selection, and in temporal integration. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Bistable percepts in which a single pattern of retinal input gives rise to two alternate perceptual interpretations provides a basis to differentiate brain activity specific to consciousness from unconscious neuronal responses to visual
stimuli. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
For bistable
percepts,
changes in perception occur in the absence of any change
in the stimulus itself. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Necker cubes
and ambiguous
figures are classical
examples of bistable
perception. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Perceptual instability also arises when dissimilar
images are presented to the two eyes. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
For binocular
rivalry,
perception alternates
spontaneously
every few seconds between each monocular view. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Virtually
any pair of dissimilar
images
can be made to rival. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Since virtually any pair of dissimilar images can
be made to rival when presented dichoptically, binocular rivalry
provides a powerful paradigm to study the neural correlates of perceptual organization and visual awareness. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Firing of most neurons in primary visual cortex (V1)
reflects the visual input and not the percept during rivalry. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Activity at
higher levels in the ventral pathway show increasing correlation with the perceptual state. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Binocular rivalry appears to involve interactions between binocular neurons at several
stages in the ventral visual pathway. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
231 |
|
Neural processing in the ventral pathway culminates in the inferior
temporal (IT) cortex, where most
neurons modulate their firing in concert
with perception. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
232 |
|
At the inferior
temporal (IT) stage of processing, activity reflects the brain's internal view of the visual
scene rather than the retinal stimulus. |
|
1 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
232 |
|
Binocular rivalry reflects central selective
processes that take effect subsequent
to the analysis
of both monocular stimuli. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
232 |
|
Is activity in the ventral
pathway sufficient for the conscious perception of a visual stimulus, or does
visual awareness require processing in other brain regions, particularly the
parietal and frontal lobes? |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
233 |
|
Multiple prefrontal
areas reflect the perceptual
state. |
|
1 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
233 |
|
Three distinct prefrontal areas
in both hemispheres were identified that showed increased activity during
perceptual dominance of the face stimulus: (1) posterior middle and inferior
frontal gyri (Brodmann Area BA 44), (2) inferior frontal gyrus and insular
(BA 45/47), and (3) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46). |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
233 |
|
Psychophysical observations suggest that perceptual
alternations during rivalry result from the same neural operations
underlying other
multistable perceptual phenomena, such as ambiguous figures. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
233 |
|
Perceptual transitions during rivalry reflect an endogenous
neural instability in the absence
of any change in the retinal
image. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
235 |
|
Research results suggest that a distributed right occipito-parietal and frontal network mediates the perceptual switches experienced during rivalry. |
|
2 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
235 |
|
Visuospatial neglect syndromes occur most
frequently following lesions to the inferior parietal and frontal cortex. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
235 |
|
The dorsal
visual pathway has traditionally been associated
with spatial processing. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
235 |
|
Research results indicate that conscious experience during rivalry depends on processing
in multiple extrastriate
ventral,
parietal, and prefrontal cortical areas. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
237 |
|
The primate
visual system is conventionally divided into two processing pathways
originating in the primary visual cortex. |
|
2 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
237 |
|
One visual pathway extends dorsally in the occipito-parietal lobe; the other
pathway extends ventrally in the occipito-temporal
lobe. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
238 |
|
The dorsal
pathway appears to be
specialized for processing spatial attributes of the visuals seen responsible for the coordinate transformations
necessary to support visually guided behavior. |
|
1 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
238 |
|
The ventral
visual pathway is involved in object representation and recognition. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
238 |
|
Research studies have emphasized
the key role played by the ventral pathway and conscious visual perception. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
238 |
|
Shape-selective responses in the temporal lobe reflect subjective perception of visual objects and are modulated by attention. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
238 |
|
Lesions in
the temporal lobe
lead to profound impairment in visual recognition and awareness. |
|
0 |
Lumer; Binocular Rivalry |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|